SECURITY—NO CUT-RATE PRICE

THE PRIVATE WAR OF HENRY LUCE

The Reporter

AUGUST 15, 1950 25c

THE SCHUMAN PLAN: A BOOST FOR EUROPEAN LABOR

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Spanish modern: madonna and child

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

REPORTER'S NOTES

War, Ltd.

Nothing is more tedious or misleading than the prevailing rhetoric that uses isolated moments of the past—September, 1939, or December, 1941—as metaphors supposed to illuminate the present.

Like all patriotic citizens, we have great respect for the counsel, based on their past performance, of retired generals and living immortals; indeed, two articles in this issue of *The Reporter* show how the experience of the past can help us overcome the difficulties of the present. But we must not forget that today's emergency has appalling difficulties of its own that cannot be disposed of by wholesale application of measures that proved successful during the last two wars.

In fact, the present situation cannot be called the Third World War, or even the beginning of it. In the era of Civil Wars, Ltd., our nation must act like a holding company which controls the distribution of machinery and working capital among the foreign concerns that are hard pressed by Communist competition and that we consider worth saving.

During the last war, there was no more familiar expression than "for the duration"—an expression that has not been put back into circulation. For we know—although not many like to think about it—that the present emergency can last the rest of our lives. When it ends, the United States will emerge a stronger, wiser, and much leaner nation.

President Roosevelt liked to call himself Dr. Win-the-War. To win the war he was always ready to leave a large margin of political decision to his generals, and to him victory meant only the unconditional surrender of the enemy. In times of great peril, he established a pattern of successful conduct of national affairs that our present-day leaders must live up to—and steer away from.

To win the war in Korea, we need to achieve something more than pushing the invaders back to the 38th parallel. We cannot ask only for the unconditional surrender of the North Koreans. We must have immediate plans for handling refugees and bombed-out people. We must, as soon as our counteroffensive begins, send a man of Paul Hoffman's stature to Korea as a sort of economic and political partner of General MacArthur. We must deal with the Koreans, North and South, not only as makers or victims of aggression, but as the Asian people who suffered most in our first military clash with Communism.

To strengthen our European allies, it is not enough to send them guns or let them make guns for themselves. The manufacture of armaments is only one of the items—and not the major one—of increased European production. We and the European governments must see to it that their workers gain an improved standard of living from their enlarged opportunities of employment—that the people on our side are relieved from both misery and fear, for these are the two main enemies of freedom.

If European rearmament does not strengthen the political and social structure of the European nations, it will make for their and our defeat. Europe is already showing how it can work out its own salvation: The sense of danger has emboldened some of its leaders to take an initiative no less dramatic than Churchill's offer to the people of France at the time of Dunkirk. This time, however, the bold initiative—the Schuman plan—has actually started western Europe on the way to unity.

We are going through a period of limited conflicts with global implications—a new phase of the world civil war. The President should have—in instant readiness—the power to impose an unprecedented degree of discipline and control on the nation. But at this stage of the emergency he must avoid subjecting the people to an effort that they could not endure over an indefinite number of years.

The time of the prodigal, all-out, once-and-for-all effort is gone, just as the Roosevelt era of the specialized agencies—set up to scramble their way through the emergency—is gone. For we may not know it, but we are now establishing precedents that may rule our nation for years to come. The win-the-war doctors who will lead us during these hard years must show that they have acquired wide experience in the fields of international relations, economics, and social work.

The enemy caught us unprepared—as democracies always are before being aroused to the effort that makes them win. Now we are on the move, and no Russian trick in the U. N. can stop us. Indeed, we are engaged in exactly the kind of conflict democracies are suited for—budgeted conflicts, which can be as well planned and well thought out as big business ventures. We are going to face quite a few of these conflicts. The next one probably will not be fought by armies in Asia but by political forces in Europe.

It is not a matter of going all-out or half-out, of being whole-hoggers or half-hoggers. It is a matter of acting fast but deliberately, with a clear knowledge that in many of our governmental decisions, we may be taking the way of no return—with no possible reversion to any pre-emergency pattern of "business as usual."

Our present-day all-outers, our whole-hoggers, our let-the-generals-deciders are still thinking in terms of the Second World War. Incidentally, during that war, most of these people were unsolicited mentors or rabid enemies of F.D.R.

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Correspondence

'Uncommon Quality'

To the Editor: As an American living outside of my own country I found myself delighted beyond reckoning to encounter abroad an extraordinary and superior American product, a product *not* of a technical or scientific character. *The Reporter* of June 20 is not only a fine collection of unslanted reports but it has the added and uncommon quality of being literate.

I would particularly congratulate Charles Wertenbaker on his "Franco: Fascism and Futility." I have studied Spanish literature and contemporary Spanish civilization for several years and not long ago I spent some time in the country of Spain. Mr. Wertenbaker has given, I believe, a thorough and comprehensive report on the situation in Spain today. If every article published in *The Reporter* has as much basis in fact as does Mr. Wertenbaker's—and is as well written—your publication should become a staple on the literary shelves everywhere.

JESSIE M. DIFFLEY
St. Cloud, France

Asian Culture

To the Editor: I want to congratulate you for your articles on Crisis in Asia (in your July 18 issue), which give a near-accurate and clear picture of the problems facing the Asiatic nations. I do not suppose a better job could be done within the same space and limitations. However, I wish to point out that in the opinion of all thinking Asians, the Asians do not consider Russia their cultural superior (as said in the article, "India—Pivot of Asia").

BAIDYA N. VARMA
New York City

The Press Problem

To the Editor: I'd like to make some marginal notes on the article, "Harlots of Fleet Street," by Fred Hechinger, in the July 4 *Reporter*.

For the most part, my objections are that he judged British papers by American standards, judged the purpose of newspapers by his own standards, and gave the false impression that what we would call "good" newspapers are but tiny voices howling against a gale of 144-point type.

Aside from that, there are a few minor objections on fact alone, notably his labeling of the *Daily Mail*, certainly one of the better "popular" papers, isolationist and anti-American. It's the absolute opposite. Not only did it support the U.S. and British stand in Korea long before the U.N. said it was the thing to do, but it has constantly supported the Schuman plan, the Council of Europe, and the Atlantic Pact.

Don't get me wrong. I agree that by U. S. journalistic codes of conduct, British papers are harlots. But I maintain that you can't judge British papers by American standards.

In this country, there is a lot more to selling newspapers than turning out quality. In the States, a paper does it with insurance premiums, sets of china, promotion campaigns of all kinds; here it is done with sin, sex, and sensationalism.

Mr. Hechinger makes the point that "The gigantic circulation figures of the popular press in Britain are in part the result of the rapid growth of *technical* literacy and the fact that this development has not been accompanied by a parallel growth in *selective* powers." Here he has hit his bent and rusty nail on its tired old head.

But he doesn't know it, for a little later on he tells of a dockyard worker who "angrily asked the Labour candidate why certain vital statements . . . had never been made known to him." When offered a copy of the White Paper, the worker, according to Mr. Hechinger, said, "Keep your bloody White Paper! What's the bloody press for if it doesn't tell us what's going on?"

I'd bet good dollars to plugged threepenny bits that the worker wouldn't have read the story if it had been in the popular paper he takes, and he might even have been indignant at what he would think was a waste of space if it had been in.

Mr. Hechinger sums up his contempt for the "Harlots of Fleet Street" by accusing the British press of "violation of the code of informative . . . journalism." The trouble with that gem of smugness is that it's Mr. Hechinger's code that has been violated, not the honor of the British press. No harlot she. It's just that her code is different.

The popular press here is designed to sell newspapers by printing news of one sort or another that appeals to the average worker. Because the papers are national in circulation, stories must appeal to readers everywhere.

Even in New York, the reader has a choice of only some six or eight papers a day unless he wants to take his home-town paper. In Manchester, Bristol, Sheffield, Glasgow, or even Tipperary, the reader has a choice of dozens of papers. Nowhere in the British Isles is there such a thing as newspaper monopoly. In Britain, unlike in the monopoly press cities of America, a publisher can't make a better newstrap and tell his readers to like it or lump it. Here they have choices, and the American brand of "reputable" journalism can't take it.

In short, what's needed is education to teach the average person that what makes news—important news—is news that affects the greatest number of people most deeply. Granted, the rape of a dancer in Lime Street is livelier reading, can be handled by the less capable reporter, and be understood by the less educated man.

As long as newspapers must be aware of the economic facts of life, and as long as British and American readers want crime, sex, films, and fanfare, that is what they will get.

MARK ETHRIDGE, JR.
London, England

Contributors

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The Editors

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The Reporter
A FORTNIGHTLY OF FACTS AND IDEAS

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Editorial

When Not to Use the Atomic Bomb

Until Korea, most of us thought that American policy as to the use of the atomic bomb was clear and settled. America had sought international control over the bomb; Russia had refused; America, therefore, had to keep on making the bomb and take no chances with national security. But America made it explicit that it would use the bomb only in the last extremity, under evident, undeniable compulsion—in a war with Soviet Russia, provoked by Soviet Russia.

We had acquired a certain equanimity in the matter. In view of the fact that we had already used the bomb against an enemy that had been indicating its readiness to surrender, it was perhaps difficult for foreigners to understand this equanimity. It existed, however; it was not hypocritical. We were certain that our determination not to use the bomb except if forced to was clear and recognizable evidence of our peaceful intentions. That is why we were outraged by the Russian "peace" campaign and its attempt to persuade the people of the world that in America lay the danger, that the American atomic bomb was poised, ready to explode the peace.

Then came Korea. In the press and in public speeches the question of using the bomb all of a sudden became an open question, not a settled one. It was not that the American government's policy had changed, it was only that many Americans seemed to forget that they had a government which long ago had made up its mind about the bomb and stood committed before the world. In a deeply deplorable debate that played into the hands of Russian propaganda, Americans began to discuss the pros and cons of using the bomb in Korea:

Pro: (a Congressman): "We are fighting this battle with one hand tied behind us. . . . This war is past the wrist-slapping stage. . . . Let us use everything we can [the bomb] to end this war now."

Con: (an atomic scientist): "The Russians would love to have us use up our stock of atom bombs over there so that they could hit us some other place when we are unprepared."

Pro: (a university president, formerly chief of the Education and Cultural Relations Division of the American Military Government of Germany): "War is not humanitarian. We used the atom bomb on Japan to save American lives and we should do the same thing now. I think a half-dozen well-placed bombs would end the Korean war in five days."

Con: (a general): "I believe that were I in the middle of this thing, I would avoid using anything that our own people or other peoples might consider inhuman. It is imperative that we stand before the world as the champions of decency. I wouldn't want to do anything that might antagonize public opinion in any way." The general conceded that the bomb might be used against matériel.

Pro: (another atomic scientist, recently returned from helping to set up the World Brotherhood Movement in Paris): "The bomb differs from the ordinary bomb solely in being about two hundred times as effective."

En route from a Moral Rearmament meeting in Switzerland to a Moral Rearmament meeting on Mackinac Island in Michigan, Japanese officials of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were neither pro nor con: "Every sane person hopes that it will not have to be used, but we have the utmost confidence in the discretion of President Truman. . . ."

On July 27 the President, when asked at his press conference "whether he was considering [the use of the bomb] now that American armed forces were fighting the Communist North Koreans," replied "with a firm no" (New York *Times*). We congratulate the President; but his "no" implied a great deal that he did not go on to develop. We hope he will soon. The question of principle must be settled with something more than a monosyllable. The "no" did not stop the deplorable public debate that gives much comfort to those who would distort our position. The *Times* continues, in the very next paragraph of its report: "In the present state of tension, officials are carefully avoiding any public discussion of the use of atomic weapons." That leaves things still up in the air.

Throughout the world the President's "no" will be balanced against Secretary Acheson's statement of July 12 on the Soviet "peace offensive." That statement left us with a free hand to use the bomb in Korea. "The real crime against humanity," said

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the Secretary, "is aggression. . . . The war criminals are the people who sanction such action. The weapons used are quite incidental to the crime." The proposition is a true one. But what the Secretary said can be read in reverse—in resisting aggression the weapons used are incidental to the main purpose and are justified by it.

To have a free hand in the use of the atomic bomb, to keep the aggressors in constant fear of the atomic bomb and in uncertainty as to when or where we may use it—is a great military asset.

But to leave the Asiatic world in uncertainty as to whether the peoples of the white race are going to use the bomb against Koreans is not an asset. It is a great political peril.

The debate that has been going on in America about the bomb in Korea has done great harm to our cause throughout all Asia, and this harm will not be wholly canceled by the President's "firm no."

In that debate it was the general—Eisenhower—and not the civilians who raised the discussion to a humanitarian level, on which, unhappily, it cannot usefully be pursued. The lack of international agreement as to what is decent and what is inhuman renders academic any debate as to the morality of the bomb. But there is a level at which the limited question of the bomb on Korea can be settled. Fifty years ago it was defined—in a book called *The Problem of Asia*—by an admiral:

"In contemplating the possibilities of action, it must be repeated that consideration for the populations involved should have precedence of the interests of external nations—even of the one, or ones, taking action. . . . The very first element of a just and far-seeing decision must be the determination to bear in mind, and to give due precedence to, the natural rights and the future development of the peoples most directly affected. The phrase 'natural rights' is chosen expressly to indicate those that result from the simple fact of being born. . . ."

We quote Admiral Mahan, precursor of geopoliticians, doctrinaire of "land masses and sea power," theoretician of war. If he lived now he would probably be extremely hardheaded about the bomb. But now, as in 1900, he would recognize the certain danger, the sure catastrophe, to which we would bring ourselves and our cause if we used the atomic bomb against this small, divided Asiatic nation.

There is a way of winning the Korean war and losing all Asia. If we liberate Korea by punishing all the Korean people, if we create the impression that all we can do is to destroy, if there is nothing left when we get through, we shall have created a pattern of liberation from Communism that will be observed throughout all Asia—and rejected. If we commit ourselves to the ungovernable automatism of war, forgetting the political purpose of the Korean campaign, there may come a time when the pressure on the President to use the bomb will be strong. If we use it, we lose Asia. If we do not use it, but keep on talking about it and wondering out loud whether we may not perhaps be forced to use it, we shall not be helping to acquire or retain Asia's friendship. We must remember constantly that military action is a means to an end and that rashly taken military action—successful in itself—can defeat that end. Our purpose in Asia is to keep Asia free from Communist domination. That aim cannot be achieved without Asia's will to be free.

In pursuing this aim we are at a disadvantage. For our armed entry into Asia, anywhere in Asia, reminds all Asia of a long history of white intervention. We, the white people, always came to Asia with superior arms. We came, we stayed, we governed; then the tide turned. Now we enter Asia again—with the best of motives—and this time we are the United Nations. But when the Asians look at the United Nations they see the British, the Dutch, the French—nations which have had and still are having their troubles with the Asians, nations which have recognized Asian nationalism and pride only when compelled to do so. They see the Australians and the New Zealanders, and they know about Australia's and New Zealand's racist and exclusion laws. They also know about our own American immigration policy as it affects Orientals.

It is true that the Indian people have offered a hospital and some medical units for our Korean campaign and that various South American nations have expressed their solidarity in polite notes to Secretary Lie. That is not enough. The danger remains that the Russians can present the United Nations to Asians as the Great White-Skin Protective Organization. All this was perhaps implied in the President's "firm no" on the immediate use of the atomic bomb in Korea. Like the officials of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we have "the utmost confidence in his discretion." More than that, we believe in his understanding of the moral and political issue at stake in Asia. But we hope the President will speak again—with contempt for Russian exploitation of humanity's fear of the bomb—to assure humanity, and in particular the peoples of the Orient, that we hold the bomb for use only in a supreme defense of freedom, and that no circumstances, no compulsion of military prestige, no anger, no panic, will cause us to lose our sense of proportion and use the bomb against the people of Korea. He must speak soon—lest Asia be led to assume that we hold Oriental lives of less value than our own.

—GOUVERNEUR PAULDING

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Security:

No Cut-Rate Price

When Korea exploded, the Truman Administration was forced to re-estimate its economic as well as its military hand. On July 19 in a message to Congress and a radio speech to the nation, the President announced the first results of this re-estimation. Further explanation came later from Leon Keyserling and the Council of Economic Advisers, through a report released on July 26. The words were carefully reassuring. The immediate measures proposed were moderate. Full controls have not been asked for —yet. The real impact has not been fully stated.

Actually, the curtain is inevitably going up on a real remobilization of the American economy. In some respects, changes will be even more sweeping than they were during the Second World War. This does not mean real hardship to the consumer, or the end of private business. It does mean a vast redirection of American business, and corresponding education of public and business opinion to enable the people to understand the wide controls that are needed. Both operations will have to begin within the next few weeks; indeed, they should be begun now. Both will be carried out successfully, probably with a certain amount of initial confusion. They are forced moves, dictated not by politics but by facts.

What is the extent of remobilization? The answer requires estimating the extent of the war effort needed now, and this in turn requires calculating where the Korean war is going. At present it is small, bloody, but "limited," cleaning up Korea being the stated objective. But the government cannot assume that other "limited" wars will not be started elsewhere. The real powerhouse of the Korean war is Russia, though we play out the farce that Russia is not "directly" involved. New craters may burst from the sides of the warmaking volcano of the Soviet Union, anywhere from Berlin to Hong Kong. These have to be prepared for. Finally, no sane American Administration could now leave the United States unprepared to meet at least the initial phase of a less likely but clearly possible "unlimited" Third World War which may boil out of this hell's kitchen. You do not gamble with national survival.



Consequently, the government has to mobilize to meet the demands of Korea and of one, or perhaps two additional "limited" wars. These requirements are great, though smaller than the requirements of an actual Third World War effort. Moreover, the plan must include training and equipment sufficient to enable it to expand to full mobilization of the country if developing danger requires such measures. There is no escape from a considerable degree of remobilization of the American economy on a scale nearly comparable to that of the Second World War—though at present there are vastly greater resources so long as the sea lanes are open.

The public does not realize this yet; perhaps even the Administration does not, and many in Congress oppose such action. I think many men in government know it and are doing the needed preparatory work. Actually, we have no choice.

The Korean episode has already required committing practically all the land forces we have over and above those pinned down in this country for garrison and defense purposes and held in Germany and Japan for the occupations. The Navy is necessarily divided among the two great oceans and the Mediterranean Sea. If we are to be ready to meet any other situations, we must create new forces, complete with equipment, supply, and production. This means immediate organization of a force scaled, say, to thirty divisions, with matériel and production lines capable of equipping a hundred—with further possibility of expansion. The building of this additional force is already under way.

This situation differs from that of a decade ago in that now we have no

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

economic slack to speak of. In 1940 no fewer than seven or eight million workers were unemployed. Women had not been drawn into production to any great extent. There was an appreciable amount of unused plant facilities. Today, practically every industry is going at or near capacity; there are just over three million unemployed (which, in practice, means substantially full employment). We shall thus have to take from present industry the men called out as wave after wave of National Guardsmen and selectees are called up. A fair guess is that within the next six months at least seven hundred thousand additional men will be taken away from production. Many more may have to be taken later.

One may estimate the scale of readjustment by looking at the financial aspect of it. The present national income is approximately 221 billion dollars. Of this, one-fifth is now being spent by government. This leaves not quite two hundred billion that are privately spent. Not less than forty billion dollars more will be needed in the next year and a half—probably thirty billion by June 30, 1951, the end of the present government fiscal year. This estimate is conservative. Taking it as a working figure, out of the nearly two hundred billion of national income now spent on nongovernment civilian life, fifteen per cent, or thirty billion, will have to be subtracted in the next eleven months from present civilian use for war preparation. Because industry is running at capacity, plants will have to stop making and selling their present products, and must be started making and delivering to the government products needed for military preparation. Fifteen per cent of labor —nine million people, say—now working for civilian consumption will transfer to war orders. And so on down the line.

Even though industry is working full scale, its capacity can be expanded. Americans are geniuses at that job. Now, as in 1941, we shall have a new wave of increased productivity. But the returns from this cannot possibly be available for at least another year.



For the present, we shall have to redirect the productivity already in use. All this spells prompt and comprehensive economic controls. The reasons are two, both pressing. With industry running substantially at full pace, there must be immediate diversion, and that diversion must be enforced. In practice, this means priority controls. They will show up immediately in the distribution of raw materials. If we need steel for guns, it cannot go into moving-picture theaters, even into housing. If we need electrical equipment for airplanes, the factories cannot go on producing television and washing machines. And so forth. This will have to happen at once; to pile war orders into and on top of a civilian economy running at capacity would bring confusion so great as to compel controls in any event. Probably the device of voluntary allocation will be invoked first, but that will not work long. Voluntary industrial committees can help, but they cannot determine what military needs are most pressing, and it will take time to learn that controls are needed. Maybe we shall only learn this through the hardships of confusion, losing valuable time and creating snarls. Everyone will be lucky if the government moves in at once. The time for drafting traffic rules is before, not after, the highways are jammed.

If physical production of goods did not require controls, finance would. In an uncontrolled economy, forty billion dollars in additional government spending during the next eighteen months would run prices clear out of sight. We were carefully balancing inflation against deflation before Korea blew up. The balance had been nicely made. Unbalance it by another thirty-odd billion of government credit (ten billion has already been asked for by President Truman), and inflation will be really away. Voluntary measures can diminish this. For instance, huge campaigns to sell war-savings bonds amount to asking the consumer not to buy, to cut down his consumption, freeing money and capacity for war work. This helps, but the chance of thus soaking up thirty billion that otherwise would be spent for consumption is not great, though our people can be trusted to do far more along that line than is usually expected. A good deal can also be done by raising taxes—taking pri-

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vate income away so that it cannot be spent on consumption of nonessential goods. We paid for the Second World War two-fifths in cash and three-fifths on credit. This effort will have to be paid for at least four-fifths in cash—unless we want inflation. Price and credit controls may perhaps be delayed a few months. Even that will be dangerous; it is impossible to believe they can safely be delayed any longer. The earlier we get at the job, the better the result.

Where will these controls hit? Let us begin with how they will affect consumers. Controls will not be drastic on food. We have lots of food. Controls probably will be needed, not because of the situation, but because of psychology—like the absurd run on sugar some days ago. When people regain their heads, food controls will be very simple and, on the whole, painless. But the consumer will have to wobble along with the electrical equipment he has now. That washing machine will have to last. No new television set. Probably no new automobile after the present runs are made. He will learn this first when he is told he must pay cash for everything instead of buying by installments. Credit control alone will not end gadget demand, nor compel conversion to war orders. But the government will probably not bother with rationing controls in this area. It will simply announce that steel, labor, and so forth, are not available for gadgets, and invite the manufacturers to go into military manufacturing.

Eventually there may be controls on gasoline. Here we are fairly well fixed. But military operations take gasoline; also, some refining capacity will have to be diverted to new specialized fuels used by jet planes and other weapons.

Will there be wage controls and job freezes? Yes, eventually. The labor force will be diminished by the number of men called out on active service. It will be replenished by a considerable number of women and nonlaborers. But as we shall also be endeavoring to increase production, more workers will be needed. It is unthinkable that war-effort industries should bid against each other without any allocation of labor.

Finally, about housing: The President has already cut the housing program roughly in half. He has done more. Housing is being built on mortgage money rolling out from banks and insurance companies. He has slowed that flow. Presently it will be a mere trickle. Within a year, the housing-and-building boom will have ground to a stop. We still need houses, especially cheap housing in cities. But there is shelter enough to get along with for three or four years. We shall have to take that, and like it.



Yes, there will be economic controls. They are not exacted by politics. They are dictated by mathematics.

Does all this mean hardship? No, not as long as the war is "limited." Add up the entire consumer diversion and it amounts merely to telling the American public it cannot spend as much money on itself as it likes to do.

Two psychological campaigns will go on while the control structure builds up. They will be noisy but short. The American consumer will want to know why he cannot have his new car or television set. He will get properly mad when a black marketeer sells one to his neighbor at three times list price.

The black marketeer will be around—he always is—though the going will get rough for him. But the American public has lots of common sense. When told the facts by somebody whose word it trusts, it promptly plays ball. Only, God help the chiseler, the political favor-monger, and the Washington five-per centers.

The other ruckus will come from that sector of American business which always bellows to high heaven when grim necessity forces the government to interfere with its normal habits. Many of the best and biggest businesses don't. But the auto dealers, the steel jobbers, and so on, with gray-market fortunes within easy reach, howl when they are told to chuck it. Even some very reputable business groups will not admit necessity unless bombs start dropping. The majority of American business will add up the score, accept the situation, pay its taxes, and work for the country. The noise will be great, but it will shortly yield to grim fact. After all, most businessmen lived and worked without catastrophe right through the Second World War. They will do it again now.

Full controls are coming up. There is no escape from that. The quicker they come, the better off every consumer, every holder of an insurance policy or a savings bond, every salaried man and wage earner, and every honest businessman will be. The aggregate diversion of effort, materials, and money, if handled with fair competence, will still leave everyone about as well off as he was in 1945.

Unless, of course, unlimited war starts.

—A. A. Berle, Jr.

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Making Our Asian Policy Work

The North Korean invasion compels us to face the facts of Oriental life

The greatest benefit given us by the Korean fighting is that we now have a chance to rearrange our concepts of the Orient. To do so, we must throw out the substitutes for ideas, the outmoded or dangerous illusions, the comfortable but broken assumptions; and we must select the realities on which we can base a policy that makes sense. To begin with, there are the fallacies to dispose of. The first fallacy is that the normal condition of man is freedom, and that he will always choose freedom over slavery. Unfortunately, the historical record would seem to indicate that when men revolt against despotism, they often choose—or are tricked into choosing—another form of slavery rather than freedom. The idea of individual liberty is relatively recent and is not easily understood. It involves too much personal responsibility for the weary, too much knowledge for the untutored. The American is at least bolstered by the social pressures of his own community and the environmental pressures of his country's heritage. The Oriental has nothing but words. We should be stupid to assume that the typical Asian will side with us for ideological reasons today, and even more stupid to blame him if he does not.

The second fallacy is that all people, given the facts, will unswervingly —and even instinctively—resist Communism. In Asia the facts are not quite the same as they are in America. To a villager in Indo-China, western democracy means the French Army, the French tax collector, the French bureaucrat, and now American weapons; whereas Communism means a bearded Oriental named Ho Chi Minh. The American G.I. in Korea has an inarticulate knowledge that, however cynical he and his buddies may be, the folks back home tend to think him a hero. The South Korean soldier must constantly wonder whether his family and their neighbors will not think him a fool if he should get hurt.

The third fallacy is that a truthful portrayal of American life will establish a goal toward which all Orientals will want to strive. This is only a partial fallacy, for in the Philippines we have succeeded, over the past half century, in giving a series of American aspirations, good and bad, to the Filipinos. Our radio sets, our movies, and our culture in general have become recognizable to Filipinos, and for a while seemed attainable. Here, perhaps, was one of the principal reasons why the Filipinos were the only people in Southeast Asia who resisted the Japanese during the last war. Today, even in the Philippines, the dream is fading. It has become obvious to most Filipinos that geographical location, climate, the heritage of history, and a thousand other factors may prevent their creating a little America in the far Pacific. As for the rest of Asia, the American model seems too strange, too lavish, and too distant to be possible.

The fourth great fallacy is that the Communists have nothing to offer Orientals, and that even where they are in power (as in China) they will ultimately collapse of their own dead weight. The unhappy truth is that they have a great deal to offer, and that they can carry out their promises very quickly. In a continent where land reform is a bitter need, the Communist propagandist can talk glibly about dividing up the land. "Let us go down near the river," he tells a peasant, "and you can pick out the piece of land you want for yourself when the time comes." This is the propaganda of the familiar and the tangible; it is terribly effective, particularly when the Communist can show that he will follow through if he gains power.

It will be impossible to revitalize American policy in Asia until we have cleared our minds of these fallacies. It will be equally impossible to do so unless we recognize certain immutable facts.

The first of these, of course, is poverty—an Oriental poverty well known to informed Americans but impossible to comprehend fully unless it has been seen. It is a poverty that breeds apathy, hopelessness, violence—and children. It dominates every political, economic, and military act in the Orient. It is highlighted by the excessive wealth of a tiny privileged class in each country,



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and by the equally important fact that there is virtually no middle class.

The next fact is hatred—the traditional animosity toward the white man first of all, and then toward any alien, from the ubiquitous Chinese usurer in Southeast Asian villages to the rebel marauder—half guerrilla, half bandit—raiding the neighborhood for food and money to take back to the hills. Most of all, the hatred is for the white man. It may be cold and intellectual. It may be smoldering but ever-present, as with tens of millions of unidentifiable farmers and city dwellers across the Orient. But it is a simple, basic fact; and Americans are not immune to this hatred simply because their behavior in the Philippines was more enlightened than the behavior of the British, French, and Dutch elsewhere in the Far East.

The third fact stems from this hatred: the fact of Asian nationalism. In the land where Orientals have gotten along best with Caucasians, Manuel L. Quezon once shouted, "I would rather have a government run like hell by Filipinos than a government run like heaven by Americans!"

The fourth fact is China—the overwhelming victory of the Communists, with its repercussions throughout all Asia. Even the battle of Korea cannot in the long run overshadow the tremendous implications of what has happened in China. The force, the importance, and the completeness of the Communist victory there have rocked all other Asian peoples. It will affect them in a thousand different ways. China's sheer proximity to so many of the other lands of East and South Asia creates a tension that will last as long as the Communists remain in power. And the existence of sizable Chinese minorities in Southeast Asia will unquestionably aggravate these tensions. It is now clearly established that the Huk leaders in the Philippines are advised by Chinese Communists. And the Communist uprising in Malaya has been led and manned largely by Malayan Chinese.

The Japanese probably did most to open a new outlet for the Oriental inferiority complex. Their slogan was "Asia for the Asians." Had they been clever enough not to pervert it into "Asia for the Japanese," all Asia would have followed them gladly. But what Japan unleashed has not been caged by its defeat. The British departure from India, Pakistan, and Burma, the grudging Dutch departure from Indonesia, the fighting in Indo-China, the chaos in Burma, the Huk revolt in the Philippines, the uncertainty in Thailand, the unrest in Malaya, and—above all—the Communist victory in China, mark the beginning of an Oriental revolution that involves more than nationalism. It is the awakening of a billion human beings to a strength they are not yet equipped to discipline, a world-wide influence they do not yet understand.

There is a leaven in this ferment—the growing realization that independence and sovereignty do not alone bring solutions to the basic problems the people face. The Filipinos, who had the best chance of all, see in the Quirino Administration a weak, corrupt, slow-moving government, unable to improve economic conditions, put down the Huks, carry out essential reforms, or gain loyalty. Independence, which under other leaders and in other circumstances could have advanced their nation, has set the Filipinos back a quarter of a century at least. It is inevitable that this must make the Filipinos more sensitive about their prerogatives than ever before.

Of all these illusions, facts, and failures, one thing stands out clearly as the key to Southeast Asia: nationalism. This is the key that unlocks nearly all doors. It strikes sparks of response in all Asians. It can be the mark of a new American policy in Southeast Asia. Until the United States is recognized as standing clearly in support of the principle of nationalism in Southeast Asia, we shall have neither friends nor supporters there.



Such a stand on the part of United States would be in keeping with our oldest and freshest traditions. Our half century of association with the Philippines could prove this point to the peoples of Southeast Asia.

We arrived there at the turn of the century in much the same manner as any other western colonial power, but we behaved differently almost from the beginning. We instituted free and universal education, brought relative prosperity to the islands, encouraged the Filipinos to criticize us, and, politically, tried to train the Filipinos in the art of governing themselves. Above all, twelve years before it was to come about we set a specific date for political independence—and we adhered to the schedule in spite of a world war.

By any non-Communist Far Eastern standard, we behaved well, and we had a right to expect praise, friendship, and support. If we have failed to gain these things, it is because we have been unable to follow through after independence. We poured hundreds of millions of dollars into the islands after

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1945, but took few pains to see that they were well and wisely spent; and we find ourselves blamed, perhaps rightly, for the faults and broken promises and inertia of the present government. But the tradition is there, and we can still exploit it.

In Indonesia we have done a little better, perhaps because we were not so intimately involved. For a time, after the end of the war, we backed the Dutch attempt to regain control of their fattest possession. Only when Dutch behavior became so crude and immoral as to shock us were the warnings of a very able American diplomat, Merle Cochran, given the attention they deserved. The United States wound up a supporter of Indonesian nationalism, and today our prestige is fairly high in that teeming land. But gratitude is a passing emotion, and now the Indonesians look to us for more tangible help.

Today there is only one sure testing ground for our position on pure nationalism: Indo-China. As matters stand now, we are in effect compelling the French to wage war against the Communists, while at the same time we advise them to get out of their colony as soon as possible. The French, of course, would like to see the situation reversed—with the United States fighting and France staying. To the Indo-Chinese, however, there is little difference between French troops and American guns: Both mean alien control.

Ideally, we ought to withdraw our support from the French, and help replace Bao Dai, the puppet emperor, with a leader who would be at once popular, nationalistic, and anti-Communist. So far no such leader has emerged, and for want of the ideal we must seek a workable compromise.

Very possibly, the Indo-Chinese and their neighbors would accept American insistence that the French name a date, not more than ten years hence, the sooner the better, when they will withdraw completely from Indo-China so that the country may be truly independent. This date would be meaningless unless it were backed by a formal guarantee from the United States, with teeth in it, preferably through the United Nations. But with or without the United Nations, the guarantee would have to be explicit enough, and convincing enough, to persuade all the peoples of Southeast Asia that it was genuine. Under such a guarantee, it might be possible for the people themselves to prepare for succesful independence, to bring forth new leaders who could compete with Bao Dai for domination of an interim government, and to build up enough strength to kick Ho out of Indo-China entirely before too long.

Malaya represents a much more complicated problem than Indo-China because of the animosity between the

large Chinese population and the original Malayans, and because Britain's improved dollar position has been very significantly due to Malayan exports of rubber and tin. The British would fight harder than the French to retain their foothold; and the Malayans will not readily settle their communal differences for the sake of independence.

In these circumstances, the United States could at least press for transfer of sovereignty over Malaya from Britain to the United Nations itself. United Nations rule in Malaya need not necessarily interfere with British business holdings there, though it should properly become an instrument for improving the lot of laborers on the plantations and in the mines.

But it will not be enough merely to support political nationalism. The Philippine experience has shown that paper sovereignty is almost meaningless without the leadership of intelligent, honest, able men. There are a few such men in the governments of Southeast Asia—for example, General Carlos P. Romulo, now Secretary of Foreign Affairs in Manila, undoubtedly our truest friend in Southeast Asia, in spite of—or possibly because of—his occasional criticisms of American policy and behavior. But the examples are too few.

Where mature leaders do not exist, we must start at once to find them young, and develop them quickly. It is not unrealistic to think in terms of a special school at one of our universities which would do for such young men, in democratic terms, what the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute has done so effectively for Communists.

This political approach would be meaningless without a simultaneous stepping up of our economic activities. The extension of ECA activities to Southeast Asia is now in the making. Already the Communists have tried to murder the head of our ECA mission in Indo-China, precisely because they realize that this program can mean their undoing.

But the Marshall Plan approach, with all its concepts of improved living standards and self-support, must take a somewhat different tack here than it has in Europe. In Asia the pressure of time is even greater than on the other side of the world. While the Communist leads his gullible farmer for a look at the promised bottomland of tomorrow, we must make possible the additional bowl of rice which he can raise today and eat tomorrow. In other words, our economic, technical, and scientific assistance must show results in a matter of months. It must be designed, not to make Indonesia or Thailand a little America twenty years from now, but simply a better Indonesia or Thailand in 1951.

One problem must be squarely faced: control. How can we ensure that our aid is used wisely and fairly?

The answer may very well lie in an adaptation of the Federal-state relationships which have worked so well in grants-in-aid programs here at home. Under this system, Congress appropriates money for a specific program (public assistance, for example) to be allocated to the states by a Federal agency, provided the states spend the money on plans which meet broad specifications laid down by Fed-

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eral law or regulation. These regulations cover most aspects of the program as a whole, and even insist on merit systems in the state civil service handling the money. There is an element of free choice here, since a state which does not wish to meet the specifications need not do so—but it must then forgo the benefits.

Certainly there is an element of compulsion here. There always is, when money is involved. But it is compulsion toward an objective never before enjoyed by people who are still under alien rule, or have only recently emerged from it. To the Communist it will, of course, be imperialism. To the peasant who boils matters down to his daily rice bowl, it would mean a double advantage: a better life and a better government.

Finally, there is the military policy to be considered. For this we have the new pattern established in Korea. It does not involve our strengthening untried local armed forces, and depending solely upon them. Neither does it involve use of American forces alone in every trouble spot. What it involves—and what it should increasingly involve—is the emergence of a new United Nations force, composed of American and other troops, for the defense of all member nations.

In Southern Asia, this would not mean that we must make the effort to defeat Communist inroads by depending upon unsure local strength, or by coming in ourselves, unilaterally. Asian nationalism can take international action, so long as it, too, shares in the international decisions.

Here, then, are the three aspects of realistic policy for the United States in Southeast Asia:

Politically, to establish and maintain consistent support for non-Communist nationalism.

Economically, to carry out such programs as will visibly and quickly raise the standards of living, if only by a trifle, with firm but unobtrusive controls to avoid mismanagement and corruption.

Militarily, to strengthen the defenses of Southeast Asia—through the machinery of the United Nations if possible; otherwise, by agreement with the countries concerned.

—D. L. FLAMAND

The Schuman Plan: Boost for European Labor

So many million words have been written already about the Schuman plan for the pooling of western European coal and iron production that it is not at all difficult to forget how the plan came into being and what it seeks to accomplish. It is the fashion too, these days, to judge an idea not on its merits but by the men in charge of putting it into effect.

That is why so many people say: "Since conservative forces dominate the politics of continental Europe and since the ex-Nazi magnates are back in business in the Ruhr, the Schuman plan can produce only a new, vast cartel of selfish interests and a policy of social reaction." But the fact is the European labor and socialist groups have worked closely with the authors of the Schuman plan, and have already endorsed it as a means of maintaining and bettering labor's working and living conditions. The fact also is that the plan came as an unwelcome surprise to the Ruhr industrialists and the French Comité des Forges group.



Wide World

Karl Arnold

One may recall that another plan, the Marshall Plan, was greeted at first with skepticism. After the Secretary's Harvard speech, in June, 1947, many Europeans were highly suspicious. His offer of assistance was made to all Europe—to Russian Europe as well as to western Europe. The plan, many Europeans believed, could not be as straightforward as it looked. What, these people asked, were Marshall's secret intentions?

The Russians, of course, rejected the plan. If the Kremlin had taken Secretary Marshall at his word, one of two things would have happened: Either Congress would have refused credits for Communist-dominated countries—and the victory for Russian propaganda would have been immense and conclusive—or Congress would have voted the credits, proving that the plan meant what it said, and the world would have been changed.

But what about western Europe? Did it take Secretary Marshall at his word?

When the Soviets refused, when western Europe accepted, the United States had the right to expect western Europe to unite in a determination to solve its economic problems. As the counterpart to America's "planning" of its foreign trade under ERP, western Europe was expected to plan its production and exports. However, western Europe did not take Marshall at his word. Instead, there arose a system of bilateral pacts between the United States and each of the beneficiary countries, with the result that the OEEC, deprived of real power, could attempt nothing more than to co-ordinate the often conflicting and highly nationalistic economic policies of a still chaotic Europe.

Though it did contribute greatly to raising western European production, the Marshall Plan could not resolve

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

Wide World

Jean Monnet

the question of the balance of payments, or stimulate a policy of economic expansion, or raise the living standards of European workers. Politically, it has been able to contain Communism in Europe, but not notably to diminish its influence on European workers.

The Schuman plan was conceived precisely to fill these gaps. Two years ago, such a plan, as a first step toward European integration, could have helped fulfill the objectives set forth by the Marshall Plan. Today, if the international situation gives it time, it should create both the economic conditions that would permit Europe to dispense with American aid and the social conditions that would help Europe to loosen the Communist grip.

Whatever may be the selfish motives of certain conservative supporters of the Schuman plan, it cannot be deformed without being destroyed. It may fail for lack of resolute support; on the other hand it may bring to the fore men determined to extend it to other important aspects of the European economy. It is precisely in order to overcome national and private resistance, and to prevent changes—fatal changes—in the plan that the forces of socialism and of European trade-unionism have taken it at face value and back it to the hilt. These groups played a far larger part in setting up the plan than most people, particularly Americans, realize.

Planning, when it is done democratically, can never be reactionary. The New Deal is an example. The French plan for modernization of industry, worked out several years ago under Jean Monnet's leadership, is another. Monnet's two principal helpers, Etienne Hirsch, his deputy, and Pierre Uri, his ranking technical adviser, are both men of social leanings. The Schuman plan resulted from their work.

The idea behind the Schuman plan has been in the air for a long time. European socialists and trade-unionists had frequently proposed it as a decisive step toward European federation. Karl Arnold, President of the North Rhine-Westphalia government, had endorsed it also. About a year ago, on the initiative of Jean Monnet, who had just talked to Sir Stafford Cripps, British and French planning experts spent three days at Monnet's home discussing methods for solving the economic difficulties besetting their two countries. The idea of pooling industrial and even agricultural resources came up, but the British made their usual objections—based on their traditional consideration for the solidarity of the Commonwealth and the security of Great Britain.

Last spring the Steel Committee of the Economic Commission for Europe in Geneva put out a report that created a considerable stir. Analyzing the position of the European steel industry, the report's authors believed that 1953 would bring a crisis—or a cartel—resulting from a predicted surplus of more than eight million tons in steel production. Upon his return from Geneva, André Philip, a former Socialist Cabinet member and France's permanent delegate to international trade conferences, went to see Jean Monnet. In April the team that had set up the Monnet plan worked out the plan that became the Schuman plan. In all their negotiations with other countries, Monnet and his group continually sought the opinions of French workers and Socialists.

When Britain held back, the Socialist Parties and the free trade unions of the continent were strongly resentful, for this threatened to weaken labor support for the plan. But labor's reaction has nonetheless been constructive. There have been a conference of the miners' and metallurgical workers' unions at Düsseldorf, two meetings of

Wide World

André Philip

the executive committee of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, two conferences of the Miners' International at Paris, and a day of study by the democratic and socialist movement for a United States of Europe, the socialist-inclined branch of the European labor movement. In each case the British delegates had reservations, but never actively blocked the continental groups. At each meeting American AFL and CIO delegates contributed their support.

The socialists and trade-unionists brought their weight directly to bear upon the official negotiations by openly and firmly insisting that they participate in the final formulation of the plan and of the international control organization it would create, by raising the problem of control of the key industries of the Ruhr, and by making it clear that they would co-operate only if the planners stuck to the objectives of full employment and the equalization of wages and social security among participating nations.

The question, then, is not whether the plan is meant to serve only the industrialists (it is not), but whether the control organization has the power to achieve the objectives assigned it in the outline presented by the Monnet team: expansion of production and consumption, full employment, and raising standards of living. The questions of the directing organization's structure and of its democratic control are secondary.

The French proposals not only

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favor a policy of expansion and strongly oppose any future cartel; they demand the liquidation of the existing national cartels. Since the end of the war, control of French steel output has been in the hands of associations of private industrialists. Even today a French industrialist, large or small, can buy steel only through the Comptoir de la Siderurgie Française, which sets production quotas, fixes export prices, divides markets, and tells the customer whom to buy from. There can be no Schuman plan if these practices are not abolished.

If production is co-ordinated and rationalized, if transport costs are equalized, tariffs suppressed, discriminatory prices eliminated, and funds set up for the reconversion and modernization of certain plants, an increase in consumption will follow the increases in production and productivity. It is here that the Schuman plan can be effective in re-establishing equilibrium in the balance of payments, especially if the plan covers other branches of the European economy. Many new outlets for increased coal and steel production can be created: by a vast European public-works program, by co-ordination of all exports of surplus industrial production, by industrialization and road and rail building in Africa.

A "European Point Four" for underdeveloped territories could be set up, with Europe furnishing Africa with the means to buy raw materials and the tools needed for industrialization and for building roads, schools, hospitals, and housing.

Although planning of coal and steel production is of first importance, similar planning must rapidly be extended to chemical products, transportation, and agriculture. If this occurred, Great Britain surely would no longer hold back. British co-operation is as inevitable as it is desirable. Though Britain may not immediately participate in the community of all the European basic industries, undoubtedly it will begin by arriving at limited agreements between the state-controlled British industries and the corresponding European industries.

The second objective, full employment, will result from the achievement of the first. France has no unemployment. The number of seasonally or technologically unemployed is even lower than in Britain, where full employment is a religion. Western Germany's two million unemployed are chiefly eastern refugees and members of the younger generation, as is natural in a country that has lost most of its farmland. There are no unemployed coal miners or steelworkers in the Ruhr. In Italy, unemployment has nothing to do with the coal industry, which doesn't exist, or the steel industry, which is still embryonic. There is no unemployment in Holland, Luxembourg, or the Saar; and Belgium's 220,000 unemployed are chiefly in the textile and refining industries. Thus it is absurd to suppose that the plan will create unemployment where it does not exist in order to diminish it where it does exist.

Wide World

Sir Stafford Cripps

The experience of industrial conversion and reconversion in the United States has shown that in an expanding economy the transfer of labor from one region to another and from one activity to another does not raise major difficulties, provided the economically unified area is big enough. On the European scale, such a policy is also quite possible, if integration involves considerably more than coal and steel.

There remains the third objective: raising the living standards of the workers. Anyone who asks whether the plan can restore economic balance in western Europe and at the same time make for social progress is answering his own question: If the plan cannot achieve the essential objectives assigned to it, the socialists and trade-unionists will cease to co-operate—assuming, that is, that the plan could continue to function at all in such circumstances. If equalization of the workers' living conditions were to result in lowering wages in one country so as to raise them in another, the Communists would of course be the chief beneficiaries.

The French proposal envisages heavy penalties for any industrialist who does not observe the plan's social requirements. The Monnet team's rule is simple: It is always possible to raise the cost of labor if other costs are reduced. Thus the problem is to lower the latter enough to permit raising wages, while at the same time lowering the total cost to the consumer—which is the *sine qua non* of a true policy of economic expansion.

Costs can be lowered by co-ordinating production on a continental scale, eliminating tariffs, equalizing transportation costs, and abolishing the double-price system. To take one example, under the plan the French steel industry will be able to buy coke from the Ruhr at the German domestic price—about thirty per cent cheaper than the price it pays now. Taking exchange operations into account, this should permit French steel plants to reduce the prices of their products and to increase wages. The German steel industry will be able to buy Lorraine iron ore at the price paid by the French, which is twenty to thirty per cent lower than the present price to Germans, and they too will be able to raise wages.

There will be no large-scale European planning without the active co-operation of the European working class. To achieve the third objective, moreover, the plan must be extended to other branches of the European economy. Wages cannot increase in one sector while remaining the same or falling in other sectors.

Such are the prospects the Schuman plan offers, if, with the help of American unionists, the non-Communist workers of Europe see to it that the promises of the plan are kept, and if its extension to other basic industries is actively pursued.

—Charles Ronsac

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Why Britain Says 'No' to Schuman

It still hopes to stay half in and half out of a united Europe

There can be little doubt that June 20, the day when six European powers met in Paris to try and work out M. Schuman's grand conception, marks a turning point in European history. Even if these nations fail completely in their ambitious endeavor to build what France's Foreign Minister has called "the first concrete foundations of a European federation," it will hardly diminish the significance of their effort. For the lasting importance of this development lies in the fact that western Europe has shown that it is willing to do something that would have been thought madness just a few years ago: to enter into the closest possible association with Germany without first making sure of the participation of the traditional protector across the Channel—Britain.

It is this willingness to cut loose from the British sheet anchor that stamps June 20 as a date just as momentous as those of Secretary Marshall's Harvard speech and the signing of the Atlantic Pact. Thus has begun, as the *Times* of London said, "a new and more difficult stage in Britain's relations with her neighbours."

There seems no reason to think, however, that this parting of the ways is bound to weaken the cohesion of the Atlantic Community. On the contrary, one might well argue that it is because of the existence of this community that France and its northern neighbors have dared to give up their traditional policy. They realize that Britain—like all of the other members of this mutual-protection society in which the United States has now taken over Britain's role as senior partner—cannot afford to break away and retire in sulky isolation. And it is this awareness of being indissolubly linked in a community led by the United States that has emboldened the exposed frontier regions to seek strength in unity regardless of the wishes of the island fortress in their rear. Therefore, June 20 does not mark a split in the ranks of the Atlantic Community. What happened, rather, was that the nations of western Europe recognized that, because of the very existence of this community, they could afford a very much greater freedom of action vis-à-vis Britain than before it came into being. The memorable date actually marks a new continental assessment of the relative importance of Britain in world politics.

It is obvious that the unprecedented situation now confronting Britain has not arisen out of a revival of its nineteenth-century addiction to isolationism. One need only read the pamphlet "European Unity," published by the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party, to realize that the British Government, far from having been converted to Lord Beaverbrook's suicidal views, has in fact completed its conversion to the diametrically opposite policy of getting "mixed up with" the United States. Nor is it true that Labour Britain has decided to turn its back upon Europe. In fact, there has been no change whatsoever in Britain's policy. If Britain and its continental neighbors have come to a parting of the ways, it is only because the nations of western Europe have suddenly decided to take a short cut to the goal of integration and Britain has refused to follow them.

This refusal has been widely attributed to a number of different motives which actually have played at most a contributory role. First of all, the British Government itself has maintained

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ad nauseam that its unwillingness to join the Schuman camp is not due to any rejection of the fundamental principles and purposes of the French plan, but only to a difference of opinion about procedure. "His Majesty's Government," the White Paper says, "do not feel able to accept in advance nor do they wish to reject in advance the principles underlying the French proposals."

Sir Stafford Cripps himself, who called this "a frank and honest statement of our position," proved in the same House of Commons speech that it was in fact only an extremely transparent piece of diplomatic make-believe. For in openly declaring that the British Government considered a supranational authority neither "necessary nor appropriate," and that there could be no question of Britain's following M. Schuman on the road toward federation, Sir Stafford made it abundantly clear that his Government most certainly had rejected the French principles in advance. It can also be easily shown that the British refusal to get thoroughly mixed up with western Europe has very little to do with ideological prejudices. The greatest capitalist power in the world, with its three million unemployed, is praised to the skies by some Labourites as a model of progressiveness, comparing favorably with almost all European nations, some of whose Governments have a strong socialist element.

Moreover, it is perfectly clear that in its broad lines the foreign policy of the Labour Government continues to enjoy the almost unanimous support of the nation as a whole. "For all the polemical excursions and party bickerings," the *Economist* wrote recently, "the debate [on the Schuman plan] gave evidence of a fundamental unity of mind rare in British diplomatic history."

Finally, there is the far more plausible view that the British refusal to follow western Europe on its new road is due to an obstinate clinging to the principle of national sovereignty. Even this explanation does not seem the right one, since Britain's acceptance of the international atomic development agreement has already provided sufficient proof that it does not, on principle, reject all sacrifices of national sovereignty. Moreover, the promptness with which it recently put a sizable fleet at the disposal of an American Commander-in-Chief shows that it is not a narrow insularity which has kept Britain from accepting the continental proposal.

The real explanation for John Bull's refusal to sacrifice any of the freedoms of bachelordom on M. Schuman's altar is simply that, much as he loves western Europe, he has only too many good reasons to shrink from the idea of making an honest woman of her. Most of these are so unflattering that Britain can hardly come out in the open with them. And so Britain either pretends that it is really quite willing but only wants to see all the details of the contract before taking the plunge, or, in franker moments, pleads that joining the Schuman program would upset its relationship with its sister nations of the Commonwealth.

John Bull balks at the idea of a European marriage not only because he is sincerely afraid of matrimony, but even more because he rates western Europe as of doubtful reliability in view of its large Communist element, and also because he considers the house which he is invited to share a dangerously exposed and very rickety mansion compared with his own island fortress. Hence his refusal to get too deeply involved is based not on ideological prejudice or dogmatic insistence on the full pound of national sovereignty, but on that calculation of military and political risks which, when all is said and done, remains the ultimate determinant of any nation's foreign policy.

It is doubtful whether those British leaders whose calculations have so obviously led them back to the traditional conclusion that their country's security is best served by keeping "one foot in sea and one on shore" have ever seriously reckoned with the possibility that Europe might suddenly challenge them to plant both feet firmly on continental soil or take the consequences. That, of course, is exactly what happened when M. Schuman faced the British with the choice between stepping firmly into Europe or being left out in the cold sea while Europe set about the task of organizing itself into a solid bloc.

There are some indications that this sudden and unexpected materialization of a bogy that has haunted the Foreign Office for centuries has already begun to force the British to reconsider the traditional assumptions of their foreign policy and perhaps even to question their validity. Take the case of Mr. Churchill. Now that



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western Europe has shown itself seized by that "spasm of resolve" which he once asked of it, his grand design for an Atlantic Community shored up by the three pillars of the United States, the British Commonwealth, and a United Europe seems about to be completed. Thanks to America's courage in breaking with the traditional policy of "no entangling alliances" and thanks to France's courage in overcoming its traditional distrust of Germany, everything he asked for is coming to pass. Mr. Churchill should be gratified by the latest developments—especially since he originally visualized a United Europe that did not include Britain.

Yet now that a beginning has at last been made on his third pillar, Mr. Churchill seems far from pleased. He blames both the French and the Labour Government for having allowed a situation to arise in which Europe sets about building that union which he himself once considered a natural and indispensable element in the structure of western security. Nor is he the only one who is obviously worried. More than one British newspaper has seized eagerly upon reports from Paris indicating that the Schuman program is certainly not going to be clear sailing all the way.

Mr. Churchill himself has expressed his conviction that M. Schuman's professed aim of a political federation "is not within the scope of practical affairs." Many others go much further and show open hostility to the idea of a continental federation, arguing, like the prominent Labour backbencher R. H. S. Crossman, that "the amount of enthusiasm for federal union in any country is a measure for its defeatism," or, like the well-known commentator of the *Observer,* that a European federal union would only lead to dangerous rivalry within the Atlantic Community and encourage American isolationism.

All this seems to be open to only one interpretation. If Britain—including Mr. Churchill, its foremost advocate of European union—now gives such unmistakable signs that it does not relish the prospect of seeing this union materialize, it can only be because of the dawning recognition that a united Europe might overshadow Britain and the Commonwealth in the councils of the Atlantic Community. Thus it is one of the incidental merits of M. Schuman's bold challenge that he has forced the British to think again about the fundamental assumption of British policy, namely, that Britain is still a world power and consequently can keep its end up with its two partners in Mr. Churchill's grand design.

As long as it seemed that the third partner, a really united Europe, would never be born, there was no need to examine the validity of that assumption. British policymakers could base their calculations on the assessment of two alternative risks. They only had to ask themselves whether British security would in the long run be best served by plunging into Europe so as to strengthen Britain's outer defense lines as much as possible, or by viewing the continent as expendable, accepting only a limited liability as a member of the European community, and retaining that freedom of action which enabled them, in the disastrous June of 1940, to save Britain's main strength, and conserve the vital remnant of the R.A.F. for the defense of the island fortress. Today an entirely new element must enter their calculation. In addition to the obvious military risk of allowing western Europe to remain weak and defeatist as a result of Britain's refusal to make it strong and self-confident, there is now the alternative diplomatic risk that western Europe may find, in spite of this refusal, a strength in unity for which Britain would prove to be no match.

"Great Britain," Mr. Churchill has said in the debate on the Schuman plan, "has an opportunity, if she is worthy of it, to play an important and possibly decisive part in all the three larger groupings of the western democracies."

Quite so, but how? That is the question with which Britain has been brought face to face. Next to the old question of whether the Channel still serves it "in the office of a wall or as a moat defensive to a house," Britain's policymakers must now also make up their minds about the answer to another vital problem. Is Britain really capable of playing that "important and possibly decisive part" in the world of today by standing apart as the middle pillar in the structure of the Atlantic Community? It seems inevitable that the discussion of British foreign policy will increasingly come to revolve around this question. In like measure, as the revolution in western Europe's foreign policy comes to be consolidated, Britain will be compelled to ask itself whether it can afford to be the only country in the Atlantic Community that clings to its traditional policies.

So far there are no indications that Britain will meet the challenge with a revolution of its own. Rightly or wrongly, Britain still refuses to entertain the possibility that it may have ceased to be a world power and could hope to play a leading part in the Atlantic Community only by jumping onto the European band wagon and trying to get into the driver's seat. But if the likelihood of such a radical change in course seems remote, Britain's policy may still gradually be modified out of all recognition. For if history has proved anything at all, it is that the British are as good at adapting themselves to other people's revolutions as they are traditionally disinclined to begin such upheavals themselves. —J. H. Huizinga



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An Afternoon in a Roman Slum

This is the first of several excerpts which The Reporter *will publish from* The Watch, *a new book by Carlo Levi, the author of* Christ Stopped at Eboli. *The English version of* The Watch *will be released this fall by Farrar, Straus.*

La Garbatella—the scene of the present excerpt—is a slum outside Rome which Levi and a friend visited one November afternoon in 1945. In the intervening years, there has been little if any improvement in the living conditions of its inhabitants.

Already we were beyond the last houses of Rome proper. We drove up a wide road lined with cypress trees, coasted down to an ancient gate through a reddish-yellow wall and among silent fields covered with stubble. In the distance we saw a low hill, or rather hump, covered with houses, which we were rapidly approaching. This was La Garbatella.

I knew of the sinister reputation of these outlying settlements, but had never had an opportunity to see them. Newspaper pictures showed shacks where the poorest of the poor were huddled promiscuously together in the dirt. When it rained the surrounding land was an ocean of mud, and when the river overflowed its banks the unlighted shacks were swimming in water. Here, a few miles from the center of the city, people lived as if in a separate world of enforced idleness and abandonment and crime.

Some of the things that happened there had the mysterious character of an age long before our own. The newspapers had told one story about a woman with a suckling baby. The baby did not grow and the mother felt as exhausted as if all her vitality had been sucked away. She slept all night long on a straw mattress on the floor with the baby in her arms, and often through much of the hot summer days as well. She was tormented by strange dreams and woke up as weary as if she were half dead.

One day when she had dozed off without any clothes on and fallen into this repeated stage of mingled sweetness and terror, the baby awakened her by crying. As she reached out sleepily to suckle him, she saw a long gray thing with a flat head, staring eyes, and slender, cold tongue attached to her left breast. It was a snake. She was struck with horror to see the milk trickling into the snake's mouth, but even before she could cry out the creature glided swiftly over her body and disappeared under the mattress. Only then did she faint away. The doctors said that the snake was certainly not a hallucination, and after they built up her strength she had plenty of milk for her baby, and strange dreams no longer disturbed her. . . .

In a few minutes we had made the short ascent and were in an open space among the houses at the top. They were not huts or shacks made of wood or corrugated steel, but big, pretentious yellow-painted buildings constructed in a mixed baroque and modernistic style, with classical columns and square, box-shaped balconies, horizontal windows, and pinnacles in the manner of Borromini. This was the architecture that the Fascists called "empire," but it was really colonial in spirit, having been elaborated with a rhetorical swagger and an underlying scorn for the common people, so that they might live their miserable lives as uncomfortably as possible in houses that seemed from the outside to reflect power and glory.



When buildings of this sort are erected in the old and lively central part of the city, they are more or less absorbed by the atmosphere around them. Their bleak walls are soon covered by signs and bright lights, their glaring colors fade, and our gaze passes over them without taking notice, or at least with no more than aesthetic disapproval. But in the suburbs or country they are conspicuous and oppressive; they lend a false feeling to the simple ways of the market place and tavern, to the play of children on the streets and the modest rites of family life. . . .

In the open space before a church a small crowd was standing patiently in line as if to receive a bowl of soup. Someone told us they were waiting for the end of a funeral service for the victim of an automobile accident. On the other side women were selling cigarettes, sweet olives, and pumpkin seeds, and we asked them where to find the houses that had been damaged by bombing. They held a consultation among themselves and then answered all together: "Go to Block 42. That's where the bombs fell. Drive to the end of the road and go down the hill to the last block. Have you come from the government? They're always making investigations, but they don't do anything." We went down some streets named for explorers of the Dark Continent, in the direction opposite to that from which we had come, until we reached the last building.

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The entrance was a wide stairway topped by a solemn colonnade, and at first glance there were no signs of destruction. But upon looking closer we saw irregular cracks on the façade and noticed that the columns had lost their capitals and were detached from the architrave, from which twisted pieces of iron were sticking out grotesquely. The columns were no longer holding anything up, but stood there in crooked array, like the teeth of a very old man. Many of the windows had lost their glass and were stuffed with paper or sheets of cardboard nailed to the frames. The space in front of the entrance was a bit of uncultivated ground littered with fallen telegraph poles and fragments of wall. Mountains of refuse rose among them, and here and there a puddle allowed an occasional blade of pale grass to spring up between two stones. . . .

On one corner of the wall there was a sign carved with "Block 42." As soon as our jeep came to a stop, children crowded around it in silence and followed us as we went over to the stairway. Women got up as we went by, and all eyes were somewhat mistrustfully and questioningly bent upon us. When we reached the last step and walked under the columns, we had a veritable court in our train.

Inside there was nothing like a lobby, such as one might expect to find after the impressive approach, but only a narrow hall, which ran out to either side the whole length of the building and was lost in the shadows. In the middle a rude burlap curtain shut off a small room, from which, at the sound of our footsteps, there came a snarling and quivering mongrel dog. A moment later the disheveled head of a little girl appeared at the crack on one side of the curtain and behind her another girl, somewhat older, dressed like a woman, and with a heavy coat of rouge on her cheeks. They stared out at us from behind the burlap, and beyond them we could guess at a dark room with some gleaming object (a pot or an iron bed) in it, which was suddenly filled with clamorously quarrelsome voices.

Marco and I stopped and looked uncertainly around us. Already we were surrounded by women and children. Suddenly we were apostrophized by a keen, intelligent-looking girl with a well developed body and broad, fleshy hips barely covered by a short skirt which revealed a pair of solid, hairy legs. "Americans?" she said to Marco, whose imposing stature and black beard made him appear to be the more responsible of the two. "Come, Americans. Americans see our house. Bombed out." And she made a sweeping gesture that seemed to take in both the walls around us and the sky.

Following her gesture with my eyes, I looked down the long, dark hall. It was like that of a barracks or a school, with dirty, peeling whitewashed walls, along

which ran on either side an endless line of doors, each one leading to a room that was the abode of one or more families. Some of the doors bore brass plates or calling cards, while others were unmarked. Along the hall I caught a glimpse of ragged women and men in their shirtsleeves walking idly along as if they had nothing in particular to do, and behind the doors I could hear indistinct talking.

"Americans, come see," said the girl, tugging at Marco's sleeve. It was easy enough to see why she had mistaken our identity in view of the clothes we wore, the jeep we had come in, and the fact that we had not as yet opened our mouths. Looking over at Marco, I realized that we must have a very foreign air, he with his long beard, old-fashioned duster, and fur cap, and I in my corduroy suit and a sweater with a zipper closing. To be among people so very poor without any good reason seemed to me all of a sudden not only absurd but actually wrong, and I had a strong impulse to go away. Perhaps Marco had the same feeling, but he had already answered her: "Yes, Americans. Come to see. Committee. Relief."

Was this merely a way of hiding his embarrassment? Did he shrink from giving offense, or was he taking advantage of the misunderstanding in order to have a plausible reason for our visit? Or wasn't it, as usual, that he was indulging himself in an escape from his own personality, pretending with complete sincerity to be somebody else, thus to participate in a humble, kindly, and respectful manner in the life of the world around him? In any case he was now a hundred per cent American. He pulled a notebook out of his pocket and leafed through it as if in search of names and addresses.

"We have quite a few clues," he said, "but no precise data, sometimes even no last names. For instance, we are looking for a large family. The father has lost both legs and his name is . . . I can't read it. And the mother . . . well, she has a sister called Fanny. Do you know of such people living here?"

"It must be Rosa, the Jewess," one woman offered.

"She has no husband, though; she's a widow," said another. "It's the woman from Viterbo whose husband was so badly wounded." And they all began to argue about it. Finally they did agree that the woman from Viterbo on the third floor was the one we were seeking, but each one of them wanted to take us first to see her own room. We were Americans and perhaps we had brought some impossible good luck with us.

"Come look at where we live!" shouted the girl who had first spoken, and taking Marco by the arm she led us down a hall running off at right angles from the main one. With the chattering women pushing us along we found ourselves in this dirty, narrow passage, with a floor where many tiles were loose or missing and at its far end a closed door. On the right-hand wall there was a shattered window out of which the women insisted that we should look.

"Look at where we live!" they shouted, with a note of strange pride coming through their lamentation. The window gave onto what must once have been a covered courtyard or gymnasium, for cement arches were still standing which must have supported a vault or glass roof of some kind. Now there was only an open area, surround-

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

ed by the inside windows of every apartment in the house. No paving was to be seen except for some pieces of the fallen roof that were sticking up into the air, and the whole surface was covered with a layer several feet deep of gray-brown human excrement, piled up in irregular hillocks that were separated by pools of black liquid. There were no toilets or sewers or running water of any kind, the women told us, and for the last three years they had dumped everything into the rubble, letting it lie there under the sun and rain.

Over this irregular surface, which lay perhaps two yards below us, hundreds and hundreds of small animals were in motion. Looking closer I saw that they were enormous rats, lazily moving to and fro like chickens scratching in the yard, sniffing and then throwing their heads back, with occasional brusque jerks and plunges forward. The whole yard was alive with this silent and continuous movement; the rats were so numerous that they seemed to cover the ground like a mysteriously and convulsively undulating black carpet. An unbearable stench arose out of this silence, and the air was dense with a cloudlike multitude of flies.

"Don't they come into the house?" Marco asked, pointing to the rats.

"That they do, plenty of them. We're always finding them in our beds. But they're better off out there; there's more to eat and they grow fatter."

Marco drew back from the window and went on down the hall with a train of women behind him, while I lingered for a moment looking out over the swarming black mass of rats, mechanically jerking along in continuous yet interrupted circulation over the wastes of dung. . . .

Carrying out his role as the representative of some American relief committee, Marco insisted on seeing everything. He inspected the unworkable public toilets and took down copious notes on the tales of woe that the women poured into his ear. Doors were thrown open before us and we looked into rooms of every description: some dirty and disorderly with little or no furniture and small children all over the floor, others comparatively clean and neat, with babies sleeping in cradles protected by mosquito netting and with diapers hung up on a cord to dry. The apartment of the girl who had spoken to us was decorated in quite an ambitious fashion. There were a veneered double bed with a yellow rayon cover, a round mirror, a Turkish shawl, an advertising-calendar picture of a bathing beauty and several framed photographs on the walls, and a set of blue liqueur glasses on a small table.

Rosa, the Jewess, lived a few doors farther on. She was an old woman, enveloped in several layers of shawls and petticoats, with an ancient face, straight nose, deep black eyes, and gray hair meticulously parted in the middle and knotted at the back of her head. She had a three-room apartment—that is, one large room partitioned into three sections, each one a family unit, with hers the one farthest from the door. The first room was completely bare except for a couch against one wall from which three small children stared silently out at us as we passed into the second, where an old witch with a great mop of curly hair was muttering over a pot of cabbage stalks. Rosa was waiting in the third room (news of the "Americans' " visit had traveled ahead of us), sitting with her hands folded on her lap like a queen on her throne. She started at once to tell us of her dead, showing us the pictures of her husband and handsome son whom the Germans had carried off from the ghetto. With tears in her eyes she told us that one of her daughters was dead, too, and the others married. She was left alone to share these quarters with the *goyim* whom we had seen a moment before. The Jewish community gave her a small allowance and she went to the temple every day to pray that death would come soon to release her.

The woman from Viterbo lived on the floor above. Marco managed to free himself from his cumbersome escort by promising to come back down as soon as he had seen her. We went up and knocked at her door, where a mangy little black dog came barking to greet us.

Inside we found the most miserable setup we had seen so far: a room with two paper-covered windows, split by a partition into kitchen and bedroom. In the front part there was a small, rusty stove with no coal or pots and pans of any kind, and above it a board that served as a shelf holding two army

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mess kits and some empty tin cans. In the middle of this kitchen were a single rickety chair and a three-legged table under which the dog had now taken refuge. In the second room we saw an iron bedstead and a cot, whose mattresses were covered only with torn army blankets. Under the bedstead there was a chamber pot, and on the wall a broken mirror supported by three nails. A wooden packing box without a top served as a drawer, and there was no wardrobe, cupboard, or any piece of furniture other than these few objects in plain view.

The woman herself was still fairly young, but worn and tired. She wore a faded coat over a nightgown, and slippers on her feet. She had a fever, she told us, and for this reason had not dressed. She had not washed or combed her hair either, for that matter; her reddish hair, which looked listless and dry as if it were filled with dust, hung down over her face and neck, and a layer of dust seemed to mask the flush of her fever. Her eyes were dull and bright at the same time, and she gazed at us when we came in with an expression of infinite weariness. She, too, had been warned of our visit, and insisted that one of us sit down in her only chair. With one hand she made a vague gesture to apologize for the lack of furniture, a gesture of resigned desolation. Into the kitchen walked a ten-year-old girl with pale cheeks, big eyes, and long, earth-colored braids, holding in her arms a baby a few months old, clad in a shirt that left his legs and stomach bare. The baby cried and his sister cradled him in her arms. "Those are my oldest and youngest," the woman said. "There are three more outside and I'm pregnant again now."

The dog growled from under the table, and she looked at him with mute hate and said, "Quiet, Tobruk!" without very much conviction, before she launched without solicitation upon her story. She had not been so badly off once upon a time. She had married and borne children, but her husband had enough of a job for them to manage. Then came the war, and her husband had broken his leg jumping out a window to get away from the Germans. Because he hadn't dared go to a doctor it had become infected and had had to be amputated. Now he dragged around all day, unfit to work. Probably he was a beggar, but this she did not tell us. She was sick herself and had the children to look after. Sometimes she sold olives outside, but at the moment she couldn't do even that. The children were little and no one was earning a penny. They had sold everything, including sheets, towels, and pillows; we could see for ourselves that there was no linen in the house. They all slept together in order to keep warm, and went every day to get soup and bread at the church nearby. This was their midday dinner, and they took care to keep some of the bread for supper. She had a stove, as we knew, but where was she to get coal, or something to cook on it? She couldn't remember the last time she had lit a fire. . . .

The woman from Viterbo told us these things in a flat voice, without the least trace of resentment or rebellion. Apparently she did not even suffer from her condition, but accepted it as inevitable and described it to us quite impersonally. This was her lot and the lot of many like her, and she did not dream of making invidious comparisons or indulging in idle complaint.

Marco was silent. This mute extreme of poverty, this lack of everything, including either feelings or a way to express them, left him nothing to say. I could see that he did not know how to question her, and perhaps had given up even the idea of inquiring about Fanny. He stood there, stroking his beard and looking at her with embarrassed gravity. Then, as she went on talking, he walked over to the window, raised it, and looked down at the rats in the courtyard below.

"Isn't there any relative that might help you?" he said, putting it down. "Your father, or father-in-law, or brothers?"

"Nobody," said the woman from Viterbo. "My sister used to bring me food and money, but I haven't seen her now for some time and don't know where she has gone. She must have found work in another city. Perhaps one day she'll turn up again. She's a lady. Meanwhile we're stuck here. The children will be home soon; I'm sorry you haven't seen them . . . quiet there, Tobruk!"

Marco said good-by, mumbling that he would make a report to the "committee." The woman from Viterbo shook hands with us and took us to the door. In the hall outside several women were waiting. "Stay here," said Marco, "I'll be out in a second." He went back to the room we had just left and returned a second later with Tobruk barking behind him. At this point Marco was in a hurry to get away. "We've seen everything," he said to the women. "We must go now, but we'll be back." Tobruk followed us all the way downstairs, where the dog that had snarled at us upon our arrival emerged again from behind the burlap curtain. We passed under the crooked columns, went down the steps, and across the open space in front of the house to the jeep. The women crowded around, calling out to us to come back and pointing to the children in their arms and clinging to their skirts.

The sun was low in the sky, and Rome seemed to be covered by a golden haze, far away across a dusty plain covered with rubble. "Americans! Come back, Americans!" the women shouted. Marco looked at the steps, the colonnade, the yellow façade, and the women behind us, waved his hand, called "Good-by," and threw the jeep into gear.

—Carlo Levi



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Spain

Feria in Seville

For the *Feria* of Seville, which is held every April and may be said to open the social season in Spain, carloads of succulent crawfish and shrimp are shipped in from the south, and at *apéritif* hours shabby vendors hawk them in front of cafés. A good way to watch the fair begin is to sit at a café with a plateful of these and a half bottle of manzanilla, brushing off as best you can the swarm of beggars who ask for coins but would rather have morsels of food. If you can manage to look like a Spaniard, the beggars will not bother you. To a Spaniard who can afford to sit at a café, they are no more troublesome than the flies. They have been there just as long.

Through the narrow street between the cafés pass the big, shiny cars of the visiting rich from Madrid, Barcelona, and Bilbao. The rich of Seville pass on horseback—haughty young men and proud old men, each in short, gray Andalusian jacket and stiff, gray Andalusian hat, each with a pretty girl in a flowing flowered dress behind him on his prancing horse's rump. Now and then a horse rears and a girl slides off; now and then a spectator is trampled.

Not only the rich go to the fair on horseback. Anybody can ride who has the means to dress himself up in the requisite costume and to own or rent or borrow a horse.

The *Feria,* whose purpose was once —and ostensibly still is—to show noble animals, seems to have little purpose left but to show the human animal in one of the least noble of his efforts, the effort to lift himself four feet above the heads of his fellow men.

You follow the crowd to the fair itself. Past the southern edge of Seville, on grounds left over from an international exposition of twenty years ago, is a temporary city of tents. You avoid the avenues of shooting galleries and whirling cars, which are the same in every land, and move toward the streets of private *casetas.* These are the Moorish-style tents where the privileged class meets itself, displays itself, and is displayed to itself.

A handsome gray gelding high-steps its way close to the fence that protects one *caseta* from the common people, and its handsome young rider salutes the group on the veranda. The handsome girl behind him has trouble keeping her seat as the horse shies and snorts in disgust at the squeals of ragged urchins, but the *señorita* takes a grip on the horse's tail and keeps her slippery seat. A waiter runs out from the *caseta* and pours two glasses of sherry, which the riders drink on horseback. An affectionate murmur runs across the veranda, and your host remarks that the young man is the *Marqués* of Something-or-Other. Your host, by the way, is the Duke of Something-or-Other, and he speaks perfect upper-class English. He is against the Franco régime, of course, because it oppresses the people. All the best unoppressed people are against Franco nowadays.

An oldish man with a jutting jaw steps up on the veranda for a minute, and you shake the gnarled hand of

Juan Belmonte that killed a thousand bulls. He identifies a young man going by on horseback as Luis Miguel Dominguín, currently Spain's leading matador, but Dominguín does not know the other people on the veranda and he rides past without stopping. Bullfighters attain social prestige in Spain by staying alive and affluent, and it is not yet certain that Dominguín will survive his twenties. Belmonte helps to support some of his contemporaries who kept their lives but not their earnings. Nobody on the veranda has the bad taste to mention that the Duke of Pinohermoso sent his daughter to a convent school in Belgium to keep her from marrying Dominguín.

You notice that the crowd is thinning out, discover that it is three o'clock, say good-by to your host, and go back to your hotel for lunch. By the time this is over and you have had coffee and brandy, it is past five and people are beginning to leave for the bullfight, which starts at a quarter to six. The bullfight is not very good. They seldom are, at *Feria* time; it is too early in the season; but the bull ring is another good place to be seen, and good

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seats are sold for three times the list price.

When the bullfight is finished, you go to the Andalucía Palace for cocktails. The hotel, the only first-class one in Seville, was opened two decades ago as the Alfonso XIII, and had its name changed during the Republic; the change was maintained under Franco, but the hotel is now becoming better known as the Alfonso XIII again—further testimony to the monarchist sentiments of the people who can afford to stay there. Rooms for the *Feria* are harder to get than an invitation to visit a general or a duke; the prices are astronomical; the food and service are, to be charitable, poor.

Since barriers of social behavior, which keep even the best of young people from seeing too much of each other before marriage, are let down during the *Feria,* the tea dance at the Andalucía Palace and the resulting crush in the bar are reminiscent of an American country club in the 1920's. Eleven o'clock is a good time for dinner, and one in the morning for the evening round of the *casetas.*

If you happen to go to the tent of General Rada, the Captain-General of Andalucía, you will find more Americans there, with a scattering of other foreigners and some Spaniards. The general, being Franco's representative, is not on terms of social intimacy with the more aristocratic people of Seville, who sniff at the quality of his brandy and his entertainment. With respect to the latter, their attitude is unjust. The general's tent beats with the rhythm of flamenco dancers' heels, quivers to the falsetto notes of flamenco singing, hums with flamenco guitar strings until three o'clock in the morning. Then, if you have still not had enough, for two or three thousand pesetas, or about fifty dollars, you can hire the entertainers yourself, and in a *venta* on the road to Cadiz they will keep you awake until breakfast. This is perhaps as good a way as any to get your fill of the *Feria.*

But, whether or not you have gone to extremes, by the third or fourth day you will notice that the shrimps are no longer fresh. They are still coming out of the same carloads that arrived several days before the *Feria* began, and they have even picked up some of the dust that has risen in clouds over the fair grounds and settled back on Seville. Sitting again at a café in town, because there is nothing more to see at the fair, hoping that the bullfights may take a turn for the better, you begin to recognize around you faces you have seen before. They are the faces you tried not to see.

There is the ragged, filthy five-year-old girl, with running trachomatous eyes, who was shooed away by your waiter, then half an hour later pulled your sleeve for a block down the street until you dropped about one cent's worth of coins into her hand, being careful not to touch her. There are the two other girls, slightly older, who went away chewing the crawfish claws you let them take from your plate. There is the lame bootblack who walked most of the way from Madrid to earn some money, at four cents per shine, including tip. There are the gypsy women beggars, with sick, fly-bitten babies sleeping over their shoulders. There is the tuberculous boy with something in his eyes that invites, and responds to, your smile: Maybe the something is pride in having matches to sell. There is the man—if you could call him that—who moved along the sidewalk at a snail's pace, then, a few feet from your table, stopped and silently wept for nearly five minutes.

At a table toward the rear of the café terrace sits a man you have seen here every day. He seems to spend all his time at the same table in the same café, nursing a *copita* of manzanilla or a cup of coffee for hours. His high black shoes, with elastic sides like slippers, are polished but thin in the sole. His white-striped black suit is pressed but threadbare and not quite clean. His stiff white shirt and white collar, fashionably (for Seville) unadorned by a tie, are also becoming a little soiled. His stiff *sevillano* hat, cocked over his right eye, is black instead of gray, which definitely marks him—as if his other clothes didn't—as no gentleman. He has flesh on his paunch and a fleshy face framed by sideburns: his nose is large and hooked, his lips thick and rather moist. He seems to have nothing to do but have his shoes shined, send the boy for a paper (which he does not read), and stare contemptu-



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ously at the beggars, who avoid him. You have the suspicion that he sits here to look at himself, to remind himself that he is not as one of these.

On display in Seville during *Feria* week is the worst poverty in the western world. You can find misery just as abject in Madrid, in Barcelona, almost anywhere in Spain, but in Seville it comes to meet you—an age-old social sickness aggravated by a corrupt, inefficient government. A friend of mine compared it with China's during the collapse of another dictatorship. The Spanish people, like the Chinese, have been hardened to bear a great deal, but régimes that oppress a people too much seem to disintegrate within themselves, even before something rises to push them over. All through Spain, but especially in Seville, you have a feeling that the Franco régime is in an advanced stage of disintegration.

This is only a feeling, and therefore perhaps not to be trusted, but it arises from an almost nation-wide disregard of government regulations — which were imposed, it must be remembered, to enable the government to keep control of the country. The proprietor of a government inn, for example, will neglect to send a traveler's passport to the police, thereby permitting himself to pocket the money the traveler has paid him, and permitting the traveler, if he cares, to avoid the police. A customs official will ask for payment of duties in francs or escudos, which he can then sell on the black market, keeping half the proceeds for himself; in exchange, he will forget half the duty. An officer of the Bank of Spain will change a hundred-dollar Travelers Cheque and enter fifty dollars in its owner's currency declaration, explaining blandly that he needs to sell the other fifty on the black market. These are small things, but they are widespread, and when government servants openly cheat the government, it is a sign that they no longer respect it.

The monarchists who openly sneer at the government certainly no longer respect it. They give General Franco one or two more years, and hope he will be "patriotic" enough to turn over power to their King without a fuss. Thus they lend a good deal of authority to the view, held in some quarters in the United States, that Franco is only a stooge of the ruling clique, to be replaced when he has outlived his usefulness. It is not quite as simple as that. Franco has long outlived his usefulness, but it has not yet been possible to replace him. If he is replaced by a monarchy, the monarchists promise a return to most of the freedoms he has suppressed—conspicuously excepting the freedom to change the government again until it has had "a fair chance."

These monarchists include generals, churchmen, and the people for whom the *Feria* of Seville is held every year. They include Cardinal Segura of Seville, who was a bitter foe of the Republic and helped to keep its social reforms from penetrating very far into Seville. Social inequality in Spain is far older than General Franco; it is deep in the blood of those Spaniards who have always been at the top of the social heap, those same Spaniards who hope soon again to be at the top of the political heap. A former leader of the Spanish Republic said to this writer recently: "Our mistake was in making our enemies dissatisfied but leaving them in positions of power." One question—and it is neither a polite one to ask nor an easy one to answer—is whether a return to power of the traditional ruling class would greatly alleviate the misery of the people. But the alternative is even less pleasant. It is that Spain will remain a festering extremity of western civilization until power is seized by a régime that will not repeat the mistake of the Republic, that will liquidate its enemies as ruthlessly as did the Inquisition.

—Charles Wertenbaker

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Armament

On Overestimating the Enemy

Perhaps the most common reaction of Americans to the persistent successes of the North Korean forces is one of surprise. The man in the street cannot understand why American troops commanded by an officer with the reputation of Douglas MacArthur should be consistently outmaneuvered and defeated by an Asian foe lacking recent combat experience. He understands that the North Koreans have been armed, supplied, and trained by the Soviet Union, but he is perplexed at their ability to advance without air superiority, and even more baffled by the problem of the real military strength of the Soviet Union.

With their long experience in global problems, the British people evolved an attitude of mind which comforted them in the preliminary phases of military operations waged at great distances from their main bases of supply. They accepted the idea that the enemy would win all the early battles but were assured that Britain would win the war. In our present situation in Korea, it would be unwise to draw hasty conclusions about the military strength of our enemies from the preliminary successes they have won in a theater of their own choice. We must try not to exaggerate Communist strength because of our own weakness —not only in Korea but all over the world.

If Soviet policy once appeared to Winston Churchill as "an enigma wrapped in a mystery," much the same can be said about Russian military power. But we do know, from past experience, that evaluations of the strength of unfriendly powers seem to run in cycles: first careless underestimation, then panicky overestimation. This was the case with our two most recent adversaries.

It is a matter of record that the German rearmament program was greatly underestimated in Britain and France between 1935 and 1937. There was a sudden reversal in 1937, followed by a remarkable publicity campaign which wildly exaggerated Nazi air power in the appeasement years 1937-1939. Both before Munich and in the early stages of the Second World War, the German air force was pictured in the press of the western powers as consisting of ten, twenty, thirty, or forty thousand planes.

In these days, when the Soviet air force is estimated in similarly astronomical figures, it may be useful to contrast those official and unofficial exaggerations of German air power with the facts from German sources. These sources show that Germany produced 2,651 combat aircraft in 1937 and 3,350 in 1938. The operational strength of the Luftwaffe in these years was, of course, considerably smaller than such figures might indicate. When Poland was invaded in 1939, the Luftwaffe actually operated 2,150 bombers and fighters. The Germans set aside 310 planes to defend the Western Front against the combined air forces of Britain and France, and used less than two thousand planes against Poland.

Contrary to common belief, the Luftwaffe declined in numerical strength during the Norwegian and French campaigns in 1940. It entered the Battle of Britain with about as many aircraft as it had had at the outset of the Polish campaign. The Germans did not materially increase the size of their air force until 1943-1944. Ironically enough, when they finally got around to producing combat planes on a mass scale in 1944, the fighting strength of the Luftwaffe declined to a new low because of short-



Sovfoto

Soviet military machines: tanks in Red Square; heavy artillery before Berlin

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Sovfoto

'Katyusha,' the Russians' truck-mounted multiple rocket launcher

ages of both aviation fuel and trained personnel.

There was a similar exaggeration of the strength of German ground forces, particularly in armored divisions. During the Czech crisis of 1938, the Germans could allot to the defense of the unfinished Siegfried Line fewer than five infantry divisions, and these were largely "theoretical" units to be created by transferring the Siegfried Line construction workers (Organization Todt) to a military status. While Poland was being destroyed in 1939, twenty-one incompletely equipped and trained German divisions defended the Western Front against ninety-five Allied divisions. In contrast to the ten, twenty, or thirty thousand serviceable tanks credited to the Germans, the six armored divisions they placed in the field in 1939 comprised not more than 250 tanks each. These were mostly light Mark I's and Mark II's, contemptuously referred to by German tank commanders as "sardine cans."

The Germans' armored divisions increased to ten during the French campaign, but the total number of tanks in all divisions was only 2,400. There was a similar bit of legerdemain before the attack on Russia in 1941. By that time the number of German armored divisions had grown to twenty, but the actual number of tanks involved remained at less than three thousand. In the latter stages of the war the Germans increased the number of their armored divisions to thirty-four, but the number of tanks per division dropped to a hundred.

Western estimates of Japanese military power showed a similar pattern of underestimation from 1937 to 1941, followed by a gross exaggeration of this power from 1941 to 1944.

One does not arrive at the military strength of a power merely by adding up the numbers of its ships, planes, tanks, and divisions. The strength or weakness of any military force must be measured against the tasks it may be called upon to perform. In all the Allied miscalculations of Axis strength during the war, the most common basis for error was a failure to take into account the relation of Axis forces to the extended area which their predatory strategy led them to occupy.

In evaluating Soviet military strength before and during the Second World War, the western powers repeated many of the mistakes they had made in assessing Axis strength. From 1937 to 1941 Russian military power was generally underestimated. There were a number of reasons for this. One was a refusal to believe that anything good could come out of the Soviet Union. Another was a complete misunderstanding of the effects of the purges on the fighting efficiency of the Red Army. It was widely and erroneously believed that the executions of Tukhachevski, Kork, and other Russian generals had somehow knocked the brains out of the Red Army. Now it is hard to believe that anyone who had actually seen a general staff function could put any credence in the assumption that the loss of a few general officers would destroy the efficiency of an army. It would have been far more detrimental to the Red Army to have purged its company, battalion, and regimental officers.

Save for a few weeks in the late autumn of 1941, the German forces attacking Russia were always outnumbered—from 1942 onward, greatly outnumbered. Population tables make it clear that the Germans could have killed as many Russians as there were Germans in the Reich and there would still have been more Russians than Germans, even if none of the latter were hurt in the process. Geography shows the great disadvantages that faced a smaller, if more highly mechanized, invading army in the vast spaces of Russia. These factors were brushed aside by the Führer, who staked his intuition and fourth-grade education against the reasoned conclusions of German staff officers.

It is still impossible to provide dependable statistics about the relative strength of the two belligerents at the outset of the German attack on Russia. According to Field Marshal Keitel, Chief of the Armed Forces High Command, the Germans concentrated 121 German divisions and other Axis troops for the assault in June, 1941. The German staff estimated the Red Army at 155 divisions at the time of the attack. Writing in *Foreign Affairs* for January, 1950, Kurt Assmann, a German admiral, puts the Axis divisional strength at 142 in June, 1941, and the Russian at 213.

In contrast to these German estimates, we have the figures Stalin gave Harry Hopkins in July, 1941. At that

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time Stalin said that the Germans had put 175 divisions into the June attack and had raised this force to 240 divisions by July. He estimated the German tank strength at thirty thousand, in contrast to the three thousand actually employed. Stalin said that the Red Army mobilized 180 divisions at the outbreak of war but had raised this force to 240 divisions by July, of which eighty divisions had not yet been engaged. He placed the total tank strength of the Red Army at twenty-four thousand, and said these were formed into sixty armored divisions of about 350 to 400 tanks each. Then, without the slightest regard for mathematics, he went on to say that fifty tanks were also allotted to each infantry division.

By the end of September, 1941, Stalin had changed his mind about the relative strengths of the forces in the East. He then told Beaverbrook and Harriman that the Germans had a three-to-one advantage in tanks and had 320 divisions against 280 Russian divisions. Had the Germans enjoyed any such superiority, they would not have been repulsed before Moscow.

A much more dependable estimate of the relative forces on the Eastern Front came from German and Russian sources late in 1943. Speaking not for public distribution but to a private meeting of the Nazi gauleiters in November, 1943, Colonel-General Alfred Jodl put the total Axis strength on the Russian front as two hundred German, ten Rumanian, and six Hungarian divisions. One month later at Teheran, Stalin placed the number of German divisions on the Russian front at two hundred, opposed by 270 Red Army divisions. By this time Russia had won a decisive victory at Stalingrad and had carried out an impressive offensive, so it was no longer necessary to exaggerate the size of the German armies of the East.

The record of what actually happened at the front is a better source of information about the relative strengths of the opposing forces than any list of the number of divisions engaged. Germany was able to invade Russia on a very broad front in 1941, an invasion which reached the gates of Moscow and the suburbs of Leningrad and Rostov. After December, 1941, the Germans were never again able to attack on a broad front. Their 1942 offensives were limited to the south. In 1943, the Germans were able to assume the strategic offensive for only a period of two or three weeks, after which the Red Army began the advance that carried it to Berlin.

Sovfoto

Mig-9 twin-jet fighter

We acquired a considerable amount of information about the Red Army in the last days of the Second World War,



Sovfoto

Single-jet fighters

despite the precautions the Russians took to keep us at arm's length. In the western sense of the term the Red Army was not a modern army, though its fighting value under the conditions of the Eastern Front was impressive. It lacked many of the supply, maintenance, medical, morale, casualty-reporting, and graves-registration facilities of a modern army. Its communications equipment was primitive by our standards. The troops our soldiers saw in the combat and forward zones were not clothed or armed uniformly. To an extent appreciated only by the people of the areas in which it operated, the Red Army lived off the country.

Perhaps one of the reasons why the Russians did not want us to see their army at close quarters arose from a desire to hide their poverty in items of equipment with which our armies were prodigally endowed. Our air force's brief and unhappy venture in "shuttle bombing" gave us first-hand acquaintance with Soviet backwardness in radar equipment and night fighters. Our offer to protect the Poltava air base which was placed at our disposal



Sovfoto

Tu-70 four-engined transport

for shuttle-bombing operations was declined. Much to our surprise, we found that the Russians had no radar-equipped night fighters and no radar warning screen. After a flight of a hundred B-17's had landed at Poltava on June 2, 1944, half of the force was destroyed that night in a German raid. Though the defending Russian batteries fired twenty-eight thousand rounds of anti-aircraft ammunition, they failed to bring down a single German bomber. The few Russian fighter planes that got off the ground also failed to destroy any German planes.

Any attempt to judge Russian power today must take into account the character of the Red Army as it appeared in the Second World War. If today it is a totally different type of army, Russia will have been the first nation in modern times to have altered drastically the character of its army immediately after a successful war.

Russia's military successes and vast triumphs in the political field have led to widespread exaggerations of its actual military strength. Despite the immense losses and damage suffered in the war, despite Russia's second-class industrial status and woefully inadequate tranportation system, we are suddenly asked to believe that Russia has developed the largest—if not the strongest—strategic air force in the world, the largest tactical air force, and the largest air-transport force—in addition to possessing much the largest force of infantry and armored divisions in the world. We are also asked to believe that Russia has an impressive fleet tonnage, including a thousand submarines.

How can these estimates, so reminiscent of earlier misjudgments of Nazi military strength, be explained? In part they may be due to a tendency to attribute Russia's postwar political successes to Soviet strength rather than

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western weakness. They have also perhaps resulted from our tendency to believe that the technological advances made by Russia in the single field of atomic weapons extend to all other spheres. Mass panic is another explanation. A postwar generation which persists in seeing flying saucers can hardly be expected to view the strength of the Communists in its proper perspective.

Stalin has shown that he views military power somewhat more realistically than those who merely add up numbers of ships, divisions, and planes. At Teheran he expressed the opinion that the side which could produce the most machines would win the war. At Yalta he credited the industrial production of the United States with being the decisive factor in the defeat of the European Axis. Nothing that has happened since then has altered the soundness of these views. Today, as then, a nation's military power depends on the over-all relationship of its armed forces, supported by industrial production, to the tasks imposed on them by national policies.

The men in the Kremlin know that at the end of two more successful Five Year Plans, say in 1960, the total industrial position of the Soviet Union will be comparable to that of the United States in 1915. Those who would point to the added military strength of Russia's satellite states should read Stalin's caustic comments on the value of those states to the Axis in the Second World War.

In the light of the Korean war, new steps in military preparedness are required of all nations resisting Communist aggression. The United States must be prepared to make the sacrifices required to redress the present military weakness of western Europe and Asia. If this is done, the menace of Soviet military strength will assume its real rather than imagined proportions. As General Pierre Billotte has recently written: "It will be impossible for a future historian to explain how 275 million western Europeans, allied to 160 million Americans and Canadians, with their industrial and agricultural potential fully developed, could allow themselves to be dominated, dispersed and destroyed by Russia as she is now, with her potential only just born. . . ." —H. A. DeWeerd

Strategic Bombing: What It Can Do



F-51 Mustang fighter

The conflict in Korea has emphasized once again the indispensability of infantry. An enemy army in motion has to be stopped, and while there may be other ways of slowing it down and making its progress costly, an opposing army is the only thing that can halt it and push it back. The circumstances in Korea have likewise dramatized the peculiar utility and versatility of carrier forces, even in the absence of opposing naval forces. And what is most distinctive about Korea is that there are practically no targets outside the transportation system for strategic bombing forces. B-29's are not useless in Korea, but they would seem to be among the weapons we need least.

These are salutary reminders of what we should never have forgotten. Americans, who are not a phlegmatic people, will be much affected by them. The detractors of strategic bombing are certainly going to have a field day—but even so our nation as a whole is not likely to fall into the delusion that perimeter war is the only kind we ought to be worrying about. It is worth repeating that in a war *directly* with the Soviet Union, strategic bombing would be our chief offensive weapon.

The U.S.S.R. is as immune as we are to naval blockade, and has on two historic occasions shown that it can absorb great enemy armies and destroy them. A strong, well-equipped army supported by a powerful tactical air force is obviously indispensable for the containment of the Soviet armies. But while western Europe and other key areas can be defended, defense alone will not win the war. Soviet power must be shattered by an offensive, and it is obvious that a strategic bombing offensive presents fewer technological and logistic difficulties than any other kind.

Of course, the strategic bombing lessons of the last war would not automatically apply to another one; the technological circumstances and the character of the target would be very different. But it is nevertheless important to know whether our bombing of Germany was a success or, as the dissenters cry, a failure.

The Allied strategic bombing of Germany is no doubt the most brilliantly illuminated campaign in history. The facts are available, and anyone who troubles to get at them must reach four startling conclusions: First, our strategic bombing knocked the German war economy flat on its back. Second, this great result came too late to have anything like its full effect on the battlefields. Third, given only the air power actually in Allied hands, the decisive results achieved by bombing could have come much sooner. Fourth, the biggest single factor in delaying useful results was the effort devoted to "area" or urban bombing—which simply did not pay off militarily.

Let us examine the first point, which is so frequently denied. The often repeated argument, based on United States Strategic Bombing Survey statistics, that German war production in almost all categories increased drastically between the middle of 1942 and the middle of 1944, is quite beside the point, because the decisive bombing results we are talking about had barely begun by mid-1944.

In any case, it wouldn't matter

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whether or not production as a whole diminished at all if the Germans were denied even one indispensable war commodity—such as oil or liquid fuel. This, in the final stages of the war, is just what happened.

In the Second World War Allied bombers knocked out two essential German industries—liquid fuels and chemicals. In an overlapping and partly competing campaign, they knocked out the German transportation serv-



B-36 heavy bomber

ices, upon which everything else depended.

German oil-production facilities were chosen as a top-priority target early in May, 1944. Immediately German oil production dropped precipitously. From an average of 662,000 tons per month, it went down to 422,000 tons in June, 260,000 tons in December, and 80,000 tons—or twelve per cent of the pre-attack level—in March, 1945. As for aviation and motor gasoline, our results were even better. Practically all German aviation gasoline was made in synthetic-oil plants by the hydrogenation process, and these plants were the first to be hit. Aviation-gasoline production declined from 170,000 tons per month to 52,000 tons the month after the oil bombing offensive began, and by the following March was eliminated.

The effect on Luftwaffe operations was tremendous. German gasoline stocks had been tight to begin with, and production losses meant immediate curtailment of consumption. Flying training was steadily shortened, and toward the end of the war, pilots were sent into action with only forty to forty-five hours of flight training. Their inexperience made them sitting ducks for our highly trained air crews. Germany's large reserve of military aircraft was grounded with empty tanks. Only fighter missions against our bombers were permitted, and these became few and ineffective.

Effects on ground combat were somewhat slower. Gasoline was restricted first for motor transport, but before the end of the war huge numbers of intact tanks were unable to reach the fighting areas or were abandoned on the battlefields for lack of fuel. Before the end, wood- or coal-burning gas generators—such as had been only moderately successful on busses and trucks—had been put on some fifty tanks.

Chemicals were never singled out as a target, but since most of the chemical industry was closely integrated with synthetic-oil production, attacks on the latter served to dispatch the former as well. When two plants (Leuna and Ludwigshafen) were shut down as a result of air attacks, Germany lost sixty-three per cent of its synthetic-nitrogen production and forty per cent of its synthetic-rubber production. Damage to five additional oil plants brought the loss in synthetic nitrogen to ninety-one per cent. Nitrogen is essential for all explosives and powder propellants. As early as August, 1944, Speer was reporting to Hitler that the attacks on chemicals were threatening Germany's ability to carry on the war. Before V-E Day the Germans were filling their artillery shells with as much as seventy per cent of inert rock salt.

German transportation became a strategic target system in March, 1944, though heavy attacks did not start until September, 1944. By the end of October, carloadings were declining rapidly and showing immediate effects in over-all production. By late November and early December all munitions production had been severely affected by the failure to move critical materials.

In late August, 1944, the Germans could no longer supply coal to the steel plants of Lorraine and Luxembourg. By February, 1945, the Ruhr was just about completely isolated. Such coal as was loaded was often confiscated by the railroads for locomotive fuel; even so, by March, locomotives were standing idle for lack of coal in districts where some traffic could otherwise have moved. On March 15, when almost the whole of the Allied armies were still west of the Rhine, Speer reported to Hitler: "The German economy is heading for an inevitable collapse within four to eight weeks." At that time over-all carloadings were fifteen per cent of normal and moving toward zero.

As the Strategic Bombing Survey put it: "Even if the final military victories that carried the Allied armies across the Rhine and the Oder had not taken place, armaments production would have come to a virtual standstill by May; the German armies, completely bereft of ammunition and of motive



F-81 twin Mustang fighter

power, would almost certainly have had to cease fighting by June or July."

But these results of the bombing of Germany came late. The term "decisive" is ambiguous, and one could make out a strong case that our strategic bombing was decisive anyway. Certainly the fact that from the time of our Normandy landing onward our ground forces did not have to contend with any significant enemy air opposition, while our own planes were making things very rough for the German armies, owes a great deal to our strategic bombing. And undeniably the shortage of materials, especially oil, which our bombing was imposing on the Germans did in fact hasten the final collapse of their armies. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the ultimate destruction of the German armies was practically assured at the successful conclusion of the break-out west of St. Lô late in July, 1944, at which time the tangible battlefield results of our strategic bombing, apart from its contribution to suppressing enemy air activities, added up to precious little. By the time those results were making themselves felt in a really big way, the Battle of the Bulge was a thing of the past and the Allied armies were well into Germany.

If the bombing results actually achieved by February and March of 1945 had come six months or so earlier,

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no one could say that our strategic bombing of Germany had no significant effect upon the outcome of the war. How could that have been done?

If in mid-1943 we had put into our air force some of the resources used in building up a great army and invasion armada, we would no doubt have got our air results faster; but we were committed to an invasion of France by May of 1944, and there were at the time few grounds for calling that a



B-29 medium bomber

bad commitment. There are even fewer grounds now.

We might have suffered fewer casualties by limiting ourselves to an air and naval effort, but the Russians might have made a separate peace. If they had gone on fighting, it would have been their armies and not ours which would have liberated western Europe. Whether or not the Normandy invasion was necessary militarily, it certainly paid off politically. Besides, we must not forget that the effort we did put into strategic bombing was really colossal.

The strategic bombing of Germany was almost totally a new experiment, in which a great deal had to be learned the hard way. But some of the problems could have been better anticipated. One is especially worth mentioning, because it is doubtful whether the Air Force, despite certain moves in the right direction, is paying sufficient attention to it even now. It is remarkable indeed that the U.S.A.A.F. prior to late 1942 had given very little systematic thought to the problem of target selection. Douhet, the prophet of air power, had insisted twenty years earlier that "the selection of objectives, the grouping of zones and determining the order in which they are to be destroyed, is the most difficult and delicate task in aerial warfare." Whatever its equipment, however skillful and valorous its crews, an air force can be no more effective than the logic that governs its choice of targets.

A directive of June 10, 1943, gave both Allied air forces the primary objective of preparing the way for the invasion of France. That was an entirely proper objective, and so was the derivative conclusion that the first priority was the elimination of the Luftwaffe as an effective force.

However, the selection of the proper objective does not guarantee the choice of the proper target system. We now know that the attack upon the German aircraft industry was a failure. The attacks upon aircraft-assembly plants simply induced the Germans to disperse their facilities, which proved relatively easy to do, and the temporary loss of production resulting from the movement of equipment was about all that could be chalked up to the credit of the attacks. At any rate, front-line German fighter strength increased.

That increase was no doubt less than it would have been if we had not conducted our attacks upon the industry. But the essential fact is that *from the moment we began our attacks upon oil in May, 1944, German planes began to be rendered surplus.*

The oil industry could not, like the aircraft industry, be easily dispersed. An additional great advantage of directing the attack first at the oil industry was that the resulting shortages would have been almost immediately felt on the ground as well as in the air.

To be sure, if we had gone to work on the enemy oil industry in June, 1943, we could not have hit it anywhere near as effectively as we did a year later. But the same holds true for the aircraft industry. Only 1.1 per cent of the half million tons of bombs dropped on Germany before the inauguration of the oil offensive in May, 1944, had been aimed at the oil industry. The tonnage of bombs ultimately aimed at oil, which destroyed the industry almost completely, was about 240,000—or half the total tonnage dropped on Germany prior to May, 1944.

Another great failure in the selection of target systems was that we never made a direct and comprehensive attack upon the German chemical industry, including the synthetic-rubber plants. The fact that that industry collapsed as a wholly unexpected bonus from our attack on oil reveals how vulnerable it was. Had we elevated it to the status of a target system in itself, we could have demolished it much earlier in the war than we did and with only a small percentage of the bombs ultimately aimed at oil.

The bombing of cities turns out to have been an inordinate waste of bombs and of bombing effort. Cities are, of course, easier to find and hit



B-45 four-turbojet bomber

than particular industrial plants, and the kind of weather encountered over Germany often left no choice. Also, in so far as plants belonging to a rational target system are to be found within cities, the latter are bound to suffer. But a good part of the "area" bombing of cities was planned as such, especially on the part of the R.A.F. The tonnages expended on that kind of bombing were enormous. Prior to our oil offensive fifty-three per cent of the bombs dropped on Germany were aimed at "area" targets, and only thirteen per cent at industry. Even during the oil offensive, 27.5 per cent of the million and a half tons dropped were aimed at cities and only twenty-two per cent at industries, the latter including the 15.9 per cent assigned to oil targets.

No doubt the chief objective of the deliberate attacks on urban areas was enemy civilian morale. Enemy morale of course suffered—the arguments that bombing heightened the enemy's will to resist are simply not supported by the evidence—but the effect of that diminished morale on production was spread out over all industrial enterprises, including nonessential ones, and in the end was trivial compared to the results of knocking out vital industrial complexes.

These conclusions about city bombing and the morale factor may have no relevance for the future. The atomic (or hydrogen) bomb may give a wholly

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new and horrible meaning to city bombing. But we cannot accept the conclusion that because atomic bombs are a convenient way of destroying cities, it is sound strategy to use them for that purpose. Even narrow military considerations might dictate other targets, and strategy cannot be guided exclusively by narrow military considerations.

The errors of our bombing campaign against Germany were not all



B-50 heavy bomber

errors of strategy, like those we made in our selection of target systems. Some were tactical, and others fall somewhere in between the strategic and the tactical. All of them added up to waste—and delay in securing results.

One trouble was in the selection of specific targets within the various target systems. In our bombing of railroad transportation, for example, a very large proportion of the effort was expended against freight-car marshaling yards, and usually we aimed at the center of the yards in order to hit the greatest amount of trackage. That usually left, near the entrance of the yards, stump yards which the Germans could use for high-priority traffic. The entrance, or throat, would have been a far better aiming point, but was rarely so designated. Equally important, the Germans not only had a large surplus capacity in yards, but some of the most important traffic, including troop movements, used complete trains which did not require the use of such yards at all. By far the most effective way of interdicting railroad transportation proved to be by way of line cuts —at bridges, underpasses, viaducts, tunnels, and the like.

In the offensive against the oil industry, too, there was a persistently poor selection of aiming points within the plants selected for attack. Although accuracy in general was far below the "pickle-barrel" variety advertised before the war, *vulnerable areas chosen consistently as aiming points were invariably destroyed.* In only a small minority of the cases, however, were the most vulnerable sections of the target plant chosen as aiming points.

Strategic bombing has sometimes been jeered at on the grounds that plants usually had to be struck at again and again in order to keep them out of production. It is true that some targets recuperate fast. But repeat raids were often necessary where the right kind of raid would have put the plant out once and for all. Apart from the poor selection of aiming points within plant areas, bombs were used which were much too light for the job. The U.S.A.A.F.'s attacks were "based on the observation that it is easier to hit an elephant with a shotgun than with a rifle." The average weight per bomb of the tonnage we dropped on oil and chemical targets was 388 pounds, as against 660 pounds for the R.A.F. But it was the heavy bombs—of two thousand to four thousand pounds each —which were able to do really permanent industrial damage on targets in Germany.

One could go on through the catalogue and discourse at length about such things as the large number of bombs which failed to explode, but the most important shortcomings of our bombing campaign against Germany have been described. One does not have to think in terms of perfect planning, perfect intelligence, or perfect anything else to admit that a modest amount of improvement in prior planning, testing, and flexibility of doctrine would have brought vastly better results.

But let no one say that strategic bombing was a failure against Germany. The facts disprove it.

We know for a fact that *the destruction of the German economy was achieved with a minute percentage of the bombs actually dropped on Germany.* We may therefore conclude that given only a moderate improvement in our use of the means at our disposal, the decisive effects of strategic bombing could have come soon enough to make a great, rather than only a marginal, difference in the outcome.

What about the future? And supposing we substitute the Soviet Union for Germany? The Soviet economy is far less resilient and more thinly stretched, especially in terms of transportation, than Germany's ever was. But it is also much farther away, and much greater penetrations would be necessary to hit at vital targets. On the offensive side there is the atomic bomb, with its hydrogen-filled cousin apparently in the offing. There is also a promise of a fairly long-range jet



F-86 turbojet fighter

bomber, of perfected instrument bombing, and of guided bombs. On the defensive side there are warning radar, the jet interceptor, air-to-air rockets fitted with proximity fuzes, and ground-to-air guided missiles, also with proximity fuzes.

There is no guarantee that a strategic bombing campaign would not quickly degenerate into pure terroristic destruction. The atomic bomb in its various forms may well weaken our incentive to choose targets shrewdly and carefully, at least so far as use of those bombs is concerned. But such an event would argue a military failure as well as a moral one, and it is against the possibility of such failure on the part of our military that public attention should be directed.

What we have learned from the German experience is this: If we had to do the business all over again with the same weapons, we could do in a few months what in fact took us two years, and we would do it with far less destruction of urban areas and of civilian lives than occurred in Germany in the Second World War.

And this too should be noted:

We would lose far fewer lives among our own combat men, both in the air and on the ground. Strategic bombing can be a way of saving life in war as well as of destroying it.

—Bernard Brodie

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Dixie

The Foes of FEPC—Not All Bigots

Last May 19, the Federal Fair Employment Practices Act, acknowleged by friend and foe to be one of the four cornerposts of the Fair Deal, met its end in the Senate—killed not by the South but by the West.

The vote was an oblique one. It was not taken on the measure itself but on a proposal to curb the Iron Guard of Southern Senators who had sworn to talk the proposal to establish a Federal Fair Employment Practices Commission to death. There were twenty-one of them, and to retain the right to talk indefinitely they had to have thirty-three votes—that is to say, one more than one-third of the Senate, as it takes a two-thirds vote to impose cloture. On May 19 only twenty-nine votes were required, because some Senators were not present and voting. Ten of the votes were supplied by the West, one by New England.

The New Englander was Styles Bridges of New Hampshire, a Republican. So were five of the Westerners: Karl Mundt and Chan Gurney of South Dakota, Milton Young of North Dakota, George Malone of Nevada, and Zales Ecton of Montana. Cynics might attribute these votes to partisan opposition to the Administration, but that explanation won't wash with regard to the other five Western votes, for they were cast by Democrats: Carl Hayden and Ernest McFarland of Arizona, Edwin Johnson of Colorado, Robert Kerr of Oklahoma, and Pat McCarran of Nevada. The FEPC was defeated by *regional* opposition.

Yet there is no such passionate opposition to the FEPC in the West as there is in the South. The Westerners, in fact, were not voting against the FEPC, they were voting against cloture. The filibuster has been shockingly abused, but it is nevertheless one weapon with which a Western minority, always fearful of oppression by the more populous East, can protect itself.

The paradox is that the FEPC was conceived and designed specifically for the protection of minorities, yet it was done to death by a coalition of minorities. This poses a problem for liberals: There are two logical explanations of the event, and the course of future liberalism in this matter depends upon which explanation liberals accept. The simpler and easier is merely to assume that the South and the West are stuffed with Original Sin and have to be bludgeoned into conformity with the ideas and practices of civilized men. The more complicated and difficult, but doubtless the more adequate, explanation is that here is a reminder of how appallingly easy it is for liberalism to reverse itself and become illiberal.

The Fair Employment Practices Commission was conceived and designed to assure economic justice to minorities. It is impossible to understand how any fair-minded and reasonably honest man can object to that. Twenty-one Southern Senators did object violently, and on May 19 were supported in their opposition by eleven non-Southern Senators. If this opposition was based on opposition to the objectives of the FEPC, the inference is inescapable that more than one-third of the United States Senate is neither fair nor honest.

But there is an alternative to this dismal assumption. Although some Northern liberals are reluctant to admit it, there is always the possibility that the Southern Senators were telling the truth. They have claimed from the beginning that their opposition to the FEPC is based precisely on the contention that it will not establish justice, but, on the contrary, will tend to perpetuate injustice.

Take, for example, the case of Senator Graham, of North Carolina. He was defeated in the recent primary by an opponent who appealed to reaction and race prejudice in a style that would have evoked the envious admiration of the late Senator Bilbo. Senator Graham opposed the FEPC in its present form, but the idea that he did so because of bigotry is fantastic.

In North Carolina economic justice for minorities means primarily eco-



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nomic justice for Negroes. Some progress has been made toward securing it. Ninety years ago in North Carolina Negroes were themselves chattels. Today they, whose grandfathers were property, own property running into hundreds of millions; in North Carolina there are several Negroes rated by the credit agencies as millionaires. Ninety years ago it was a crime in North Carolina to teach a slave to read; today, the average salary of a Negro schoolteacher there, by virtue of seniority, is actually higher than that of a white teacher. Today no trade, business, or profession is closed to North Carolina Negroes.

It would be fatuous to claim that North Carolina Negroes enjoy complete economic, political, or social justice. But it is just as fatuous to proceed on the theory that Federal intervention is necessary to inaugurate the process of attaining justice; that process was inaugurated long ago and has already covered part of the distance toward its goal. The problem today is not to start it but to speed it up, and legislation must be judged by its probable effectiveness in achieving that end.

The FEPC has not yet been enacted into law, but the effort to enact it has helped contribute to the defeat of Claude Pepper in Florida, the defeat of Frank Graham in North Carolina, and the victory of Herman Talmadge in Georgia. It can hardly be supposed that any of these events has tended to better the position of the Negro.

In the words of Grover Cleveland, it is a condition that confronts us—not a theory. The establishment of equal justice between classes in a homogeneous society is sufficiently difficult; it is much more so in a society that is not homogeneous. In such a society it is necessary to combat, in addition to pride, ordinary prejudice, and grasping self-interest, the potent factor of xenophobia, or hatred of the alien, which is one of the most ancient and universal of all social patterns.

This social pattern is a relic of barbarism, and it must be erased if civilization is to continue to advance; but let no man think that its erasure is simple and easy. It is flatly impossible where there is real fear that the erasure would be followed by domination of one group over another.

That fear of black domination is no



An assist from the West

mere chimera has twice been demonstrated to the South. All the world remembers the era ironically termed "Reconstruction," immediately following the Civil War, when the bayonets of an army of occupation pinned down the white South for ten years while the social order collapsed; but many Northerners have forgotten that there was a second lesson, twenty-five years later. This was in the 1890's, when the radical movement called Populism fused with the Republican Party and made sizable inroads in many Southern states. This, not Reconstruction, is the period from which the one-party system really dates. The party of fusion owed a heavy political debt to the Negro vote, and paid it with a lavish distribution of offices to black men. Less than a full generation out of slavery, many were politically incompetent—less corrupt themselves than victims, through inexperience, of every breed of white rascal. But regardless of the cause, the net result was that it became scandalous for a white man thereafter to associate with the party that had inflicted this government on the people.

One weird result of this situation has been the creation of a group of political prisoners, millions strong, consisting of people who hate the Democratic Party and everything it stands for, but who consistently vote the Democratic ticket because they cannot face the social odium that attaches to the name "Republican." This accounts for the red-hot movement led by Governor J. Strom Thurmond of South Carolina. During the campaign of 1948 it was clear that many of Mr. Thurmond's States Rights Party followers had not the faintest idea of what he stood for. All they knew was that he was lily-white, and fighting the President.

Needless to say, this element in the Dixiecrat movement contributes nothing to political philosophy. A jailbreak is not a school for statesmen. But Governor Thurmond himself is genuinely disturbed by the problem that haunted John C. Calhoun—the problem of sustaining majority rule without subjecting minorities to the risk of moral and intellectual, as well as political, oppression. Calhoun was the subtlest of our political thinkers, but he found no solution; so it is not surprising that Governor Thurmond's Dixiecrat movement is a somewhat less than adequate answer.

Suppose that the FEPC in its present form were not only enacted but enforced. The Southern Negro thereafter would enjoy certain definite advantages, but he would not enjoy full citizenship, because those advantages would be based on the superior force of the Federal government, not on the sense of justice of the white majority. The position of the Negro would be somewhat like that of white men in China under the old régime of extraterritoriality—more advantageous, but safe only as long as the supporting power was strong enough to hold down the native population. This is precisely

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what happened after 1865; but when the army of occupation marched out in 1876, all the Negro's advantages marched out with it. Freedom of person he did retain; but the white South by that time had admitted that slavery was a vicious and ruinous system and nobody, barring, perhaps, a few crackpots, wished to re-establish it.

The South has not yet admitted that the policy of segregation is at all comparable. But the segregation laws have very gradually been breaking down without Federal intervention. In some places—Maryland, for instance—segregation in public conveyances had fallen into disuse many years before the laws were formally repealed, and there is no doubt that its rigidity was relaxing throughout the South before the FEPC was heard of.

Theoretically, segregation could be abolished tomorrow by fiat of the Federal government. But theoretically liquor was abolished by that same fiat thirty years ago, and we all know what happened. To the extent that many millions of people would think it unjust and feel no compunction about violating it, the FEPC resembles prohibition, and men who recognize this fact are neither insincere nor stupid.

The fact is that Governor Thurmond and his most vigorous opponents are making the same mistake. Each seeks the protection of minority rights by some sort of legalistic formula. It is the mistake that Calhoun made and that the administrators of the Reconstruction made after he was dead. But the problem is not to be solved by formula, for the problem is essentially that of keeping liberalism liberal; and that can be accomplished only by a never-ceasing process of information and education, never by constitutions, statutes, or any other strictly legalistic instrumentality. —GERALD W. JOHNSON



Views & Reviews

The Private War Of Henry Luce

When the Chicago *Tribune* lit into President Truman for an "illegal declaration of war" in Korea, the editors of *Life* magazine were dazed but not bewildered. "This leaves us dazed . . ." their editorial on July 10 said. "If we weren't used to the sublime illogicality of the human animal, it would bewilder us to see the *Trib* line up with *Pravda* and the written words of Owen Lattimore."

This reviewer was both dazed and bewildered to see, in that and subsequent issues of *Time* and *Life,* Henry Luce and his men joining the chorus of sublime illogicality, the mighty hymn of hate that the *Tribune* and *Pravda* are directing at Dean Acheson.

It was a kind of irresponsibility more easily associated with the *Tribune* than with his own publication which made *Time's* correspondent, John Osborne, write in the July 17 issue: ". . . I see nothing but an indictment of those in Washington who have perpetrated this crime against the vital interests of our country" (not supporting Chiang); which caused *Life* (July 24) to say the entire trouble in the West Pacific was the "fundamental errors [which] were the errors of the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson." It was a partisan hatred which led *Time* blandly to present General MacArthur's avoidance of "interference from his nominal superiors" as an amusing quality, one which—considering the hopelessly low I.Q. of everyone in Washington, *Time* seems grateful for. ("His independence had once prompted Franklin Roosevelt to sigh: 'I wish MacArthur would tell *me* these things.'"—*Time,* July 10.)

Since the invasion of South Korea, the Chicago *Tribune,* its Eastern counterpart, the Washington *Times-Herald,* the New York *Daily News,* and the New York *Daily Mirror* have dissociated themselves from the U.N. police action and have started criticizing U.N. policy from the viewpoint of the personal foreign policies of their owners.

On June 26 the *Tribune* and the *Times-Herald* said: ". . . not one American in a thousand believes that the defense of Korea is worth the life of a husband, a son, or a brother. The members of Congress know this and will not vote for war without weighing the risks. . . ." Reviewing Harry S. Truman's "ebbing" political fortunes, these papers concluded bluntly: "He could use a war."

McCormick's exposure of the "illegality" of the President's action was echoed in Union and Red Squares. "In tune with the shocking war in Korea was the dictatorial way in which Mr. Truman launched it," said William Z. Foster (*Daily Worker,* July 12). "He . . . never so much as asked a by-your-leave from Congress." *Pravda* (June 28) demanded: "Who authorized the American Government to take this step?" Two days later in New York, the *Worker,* in an editorial presumably written by its editor, John Gates, charged that Truman had started the war as "the one big hope . . . for averting an economic crash."

The *Times-Herald* (July 1) had already given obvious comfort to the enemy's propaganda machine by saying that Truman had prepared secret plans "for totalitarian control of everything and everybody" as early as 1947, "for what the New Deal calls war mobilization." Thus Colonel McCormick indicated that Truman, and not the North Koreans, had actually started the war.

"Mr. Roosevelt," the *Times-Herald* said on June 28, "hoped that the Ger-

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mans would start the shooting war against our convoy vessels in the Atlantic but was disappointed and finally had to squeeze the Japanese into their attack on Pearl Harbor. Mr. Truman's problem is simpler."

A successful campaign in Korea would strengthen the United Nations and prove it an instrument of real collective security. In Korea it could succeed where the League of Nations—to the isolationists' delight—failed in Manchuria, Ethiopia, Spain, and Finland.

And so McCormick and Hearst joined battle, not with the Communist aggressor, but with the United Nations. "The New Deal crowd and the subversives who tag along with it are seizing on Mr. Truman's coup d'etat . . . as a handy means of dealing a fatal stroke to the Constitution," said the *Tribune*. "Their intention is to substitute the government of the United Nations for the Government of the United States."

Actually, the major right-wing offensive against the U.N. was going to be launched from New York City. On July 6 the *Daily News* topped its editorial with photographs of the United States and the United Nations flags, and said: "It is being urged here and there that our men in Korea fight under the strange looking banner pictured above, right, instead of the revered flag on the left. . . . Under which of these flags do you think our men would do their best fighting, in Korea or anywhere else beneath God's glittering sun?"

The paper kept readers in suspense until the following day, when it answered its question by saying "that one excellent way not to fight a war—maybe, indeed, an ideal way to lose one—is to belong to the United Nations." It sneered at the appointment of Douglas MacArthur as commander-in-chief of the U.N. forces. "If the UN grabbers for power have their way," warned the *News*, "Gen. MacArthur will shortly find himself the No. 2 boy in this fight, and subordinate to Trygve Lie. . . . The man we may soon be calling Generalissimo Lie . . ." (Simultaneously Lie was depicted in Moscow as a monkey dancing to the "Wall Street warmongers" tune.)

William Randolph Hearst's *Daily Mirror* lost no time in joining the attack on the U.N. On June 26, the day after the invasion, the *Mirror* decided that this was "the occasion to determine whether the United Nations should be junked or changed." On July 8 it called for making MacArthur "the boss, the absolute boss," and served notice against U.N. "meddling." On July 11, however, the *Daily News* regained the initiative from both *Mirror* and *Worker* by complaining that MacArthur was being forced to "fly the cockeyed-looking U.N. flag along with the Stars and Stripes, and to conduct his Korean campaign in a manner satisfactory to the Pentagon, the State Department and the U.N." The tendency to object to any "interference" with MacArthur was gaining momentum—and the objections came most strongly from those who saw in every Presidential move to prosecute the war a step toward "dictatorship."

On June 27 the *News* said: ". . . the answer would be to put Gen. Douglas MacArthur in supreme charge of our whole East Asia, Formosa, Philippines and Japan policy . . . if Truman and Acheson haven't the statesmanlike humility and the bigness of mind to give the job to MacArthur with no strings attached, what kind of mental and spiritual pigmies are Truman and Acheson?"

Perhaps the reader of the lunatic-fringe press expects little else if, as may be open to some doubt, he ever descends to the editorial page from the more rewarding heights of pictures, sports, and comics. But it is "bewildering" indeed to find *Time* and *Life* equally ready to endow General MacArthur with imperial powers, to put Mr. Acheson out of office, and to abandon the U.N.-U.S. policy of containment.

At the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, the Luce publications evidently decided that the war was to be the property of Chiang Kai-shek, to be shared perhaps with General MacArthur, but not with Dean Acheson and those who follow the U.S.-U.N. policy.

In adopting Chiang's war as his own, Henry Luce is following a precedent set by Hearst, the patron of the Spanish-American War, and by McCormick, who has taken a proprietary interest in all U.S. military matters.

Time suggested strongly that MacArthur ought to be given "full responsibility for all relationships, military and otherwise, between the U.S. and Nationalist China," and that while Chiang "does not lay this down precisely as a condition to . . . the acceptance of U.S. participation in Nationalist affairs," he can't think of any other acceptable American. The Chicago *Tribune*, the *Daily News*, and the *Daily Mirror* advocate handing over American policymaking to General MacArthur, but *Time* prefers Chiang in that position; presumably the generalissimo could demand replacement

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AMAZING BRO

of MacArthur if the latter at any time failed to live up to expectations.

That *Time,* however, does not expect this to happen may be deduced from its recent cover story on MacArthur. "Inside the Dai Ichi Building, once the heart of a Japanese insurance empire, bleary-eyed staff officers looked up from stacks of paper, whispered proudly, 'God, the man is great.' General Almond, his chief of staff, said straight out, 'He's the greatest man alive.' And reverent Air Force General George E. Stratemeyer put it as strongly as it could be put . . . : 'He's the greatest man in history.' "

(A few weeks later *Time* ran a full-page newspaper ad about its Korean coverage. "A good example of objective reporting," MacArthur was quoted as saying. The general demonstrated soldierly restraint in not calling it "the most objective reporting in history.")

The advocates of transferring policy-making powers to a military man are hitting wildly in all directions in fixing the blame for our unpreparedness in Korea. Too much tax money for "social experiments and global prodigality," said the *Mirror* (July 17). "Pinkish, mollycoddling, pro-Communist policies of the discredited State Department . . ." A neater trick was achieved by the *Times-Herald* (June 28): One and the same editorial recalled that MacArthur had thought Korea "so indefensible that he counseled withdrawal of our troops" and then charged that Truman "took the advice of his man, Lattimore, to abandon the Korean Republic to its fate . . ." A few days earlier the paper had attacked Truman for *not* abandoning the Korean Republic to its fate.

One cannot help conclude that the total effort is to discredit every agency of the government and every political action that remains within democratic limits. (The *Tribune* carefully places the bipartisan foreign-policy Republicans within the realm of its scorn.) In its ultimate effect, this becomes a direct attack on all civilian control and leadership.

Despite the outraged liberalism of its editorial on *Tribune* isolationism, *Life,* too, has strayed in strange directions. "It was Acheson . . . who befriended Alger Hiss and was mixed up with the Owen Lattimore crowd in the State Department who stupidly or deliberately played into Communist hands in Asia," *Life* hinted darkly. It then made the strange admission that "the military men, hamstrung by economic cuts, backed away" when Acheson offered them "a phony choice: all-out commitment of U.S. strength to anti-Communist forces in Asia or no effective resistance at all."

And why had the economic cuts been made? *Life's* answer is not much different from the *Tribune's.* We did not spend enough on defense "Because Harry S. Truman is a politician" who promised the people "some expensive things—continued high farm price supports, increased social security—and in order to pay off his campaign promises he took the money from the military budget" (*Life,* July 24).

This does not, of course, explain the predominantly Republican vote against aid to Korea in Congress.

Life, too, harks back to the mystical period of intermingled treason-and-New Deal. It recalled that in 1943 F.D.R thought Stalin had no further territorial ambitions. "This trustful view of Soviet aspirations," said *Life,* "was characteristic of top-level U.S. political leadership . . ." It might have added that it was also characteristic of *Life's* own editorials, which guessed (August, 1944) that Stalin "very likely wants most of Europe to be under 'democratic' governments" and (March, 1943) that an unreformed Chiang government was "all too likely to get into trouble with Russia."

The Luce publications simply have resumed their blind support of Chiang. While before the outbreak in Korea *Time* and *Life* were fighting his war as partisan guerrillas, they have mistaken the present action as the signal for open combat. Worse, perhaps, they are either oblivious to the real U.N.-U.S. policy or partisan enough to mislead their readers into believing that this policy is un-American.

Consequently *Life* has jumped to the private conclusion that the President's stand on Formosa means "the U.S. need no longer confine itself to a piece-by-piece defense of whatever the Communists choose to threaten."

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IERS CIRCUS

(The *Mirror,* June 28, similarly concludes that "the fact that an American fleet will defend Formosa is a complete change of policy. The Acheson policy of ignoring Chiang Kai-shek altogether . . . is nullified.") In other words, *Life* (like Hearst) celebrates the end of the policy of containment and, without spelling it out, welcomes a new policy. Obviously, there are only two available new courses: appeasement or starting a preventive total war (the logical result of joining forces with Chiang).

In one italicized paragraph *Life* boils down its own editorial stand:

"Someday, a president of the U.S. will have to take a fighting stand against Communism somewhere west of California. It will be better to do it today than tomorrow. It would have been better to do it yesterday than today. And a lot better day before yesterday."

Only a fool or an appeaser would deny that some day we may have to undertake this grim task—perhaps not only west of California but also east of New York. But to say that we should have done so "yesterday" is to subscribe to the inevitability of war, a doctrine which, even were it morally defensible, would be diplomatically, politically, and therefore militarily suicidal. It is a policy which necessitates preparation for a battle without allies. It would mean that we, not the Reds, would overnight turn the Soviet "peace front" into a winning offensive.

In calling on the United States to back up Chiang, *Life* says: "We cannot expect to find in Asia any government which is strongly established—let alone 'good' by our civics textbook standards. . . . We *can* find governments which are a) anti-Communist, b) pro-American or pro-democratic, c) aiming to develop their countries along democratic lines. . . ." The answer is, however, that Chiang has been repudiated by his own people. It would be interesting to know whether the editors of *Life* consider the terms "pro-American" and "pro-democratic" synonymous, or whether they would welcome pro-Americans who are anti-democratic.

Time recently published the following report from Formosa: ". . . a disturbing dislike of the U.S. and all things American is now evident in Taipei. The Generalissimo is in a state of disturbing and potentially disastrous antipathy to the U.S. . . . Senior Chinese officers, U.S.-trained and known to be strongly pro-American, are being harassed, limited in authority, and actually threatened with the loss of their commands (and, some genuinely fear, their very lives)."

This report too came from John Osborne, who is *Time-Life* senior correspondent in the Far East, and who apparently has been charged with the task of formulating the policy that Luce and Chiang would like to institute after their dismissal of Acheson.

Life's purpose obviously was to persuade (to use a polite word) Americans to rejoin Chiang; but it would seem to require a *Life*like blindness on Far Eastern affairs to bank on the pro-democratic tendency of a government that threatens the lives of pro-American citizens.

This reviewer wants neither to carp nor to whitewash. Nor is he inspired by undue alarm. The response by the overwhelming majority of the people to the President's action under the United Nations Charter is sufficient assurance. But venom spilled at random can do America incalculable harm in the rest of the world. Our political friends can easily be weakened in their faith in us, particularly since our enemy stands poised to reprint and enlarge upon every incriminating comment made in the American press.

In these terms, the words of *Time* and *Life* are even more dangerous than those of the irresponsible right-wing fringe. In their peculiar obsession with the fortunes of Chiang Kai-shek they have not only discredited the State Department but attacked the whole plan of containment. Whether we like it or not, most of the anti-Communist world has put its faith and hope into the containment of Russia as the only alternative to total war or Communist slavery. These nations have endorsed that policy as a contract with the United States, and they must be severely shaken by attempts such as *Life's* to throw the shadow of Hiss and the insinuation of Lattimore (whom no court has found guilty and who has



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

been cleared by the Senate Investigating Committee) over their chosen strategy.

United Nations support of the American action in Korea simply proves that London, Paris, Rome, Scandinavia, free Asia, and most of the Middle East understand the significance of the strategy of limited war within the over-all containment plan. There is, however, every indication that these free countries would cancel their contract if the United States were to scrap the plan on which the contract has been based. Moreover we certainly should not forget the fact that some of these countries have already recognized Red China. By overlooking these facts, *Life* actually would lead its readers toward the fateful move of scrapping a potentially successful plan to defeat Russian imperialism at a time when no acceptable substitute policy—other than a total war with far from total preparedness—is ready to hand.

To see *Life* and *Time* editors undermine a policy that may prevent a world war without compromising freedom or alienating worthy allies is "bewildering." It is "bewildering" too, to see *Time* and *Life* join McCormick and Hearst. Unlike the editors of the Luce publications, however, this reviewer is not hopelessly resigned to "the sublime illogicality of the human animal." Human capacity for progress, outside the lunatic fringe, is as unlimited as are time and life themselves.

—Fred M. Hechinger

Stalin Cracks Down

This year, the Soviet people, represented by eminent philologists—but not, as will be seen, by the most eminent of them all—met in Moscow to pay tribute to the memory of Nikolai Yakovlevich Marr. Marr died fifteen years ago. "The Soviet people," proclaimed the congress, "profoundly revere the memory of their glorious son, whose works are a most sharp ideological weapon against bourgeois, idealistic linguistics which propagandizes reactionary, racist theories."

Essential in Marr's thinking was this clear idea: There is a bourgeois language and a proletarian language, and the two are always in conflict. When you have a revolution, the bourgeois language must disappear together with the burgeois culture.

The congress proceeded to inquire, in the usual spirit of "Bolshevist criticism and self-criticism," as to whether this weapon was being properly and diligently used. The congress found much that was retrograde to deplore—two culprits to warn: "There are even open attacks against Marr's linguistics by Professors Chikobava and Akhvlidiani, who preach the ideas of Neo-Grammarians and immanentists. These alien tendencies have not yet received a proper rebuff."

(*All this customary Soviet follow-the-leader rigamarole is tiresome in the extreme to write about or to read. Let us take a breather. Without leaving the field of linguistics here is some American linguistics—from the* Annals *of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, May issue: "Eighter from Decatur: Point eight in craps. Fever in the South: point five in craps. Strychnine: point nine in craps."*)

Back to business. The scientific Russian journal *Voprosy Filosofii* was upset by the proceedings at the congress which honored Marr: "A number of theoretical reports delivered at the session did not give a sufficiently profound analysis of the ideological wealth of the teachings of the inspired Soviet scientist N. Ya. Marr. . . . The results of the session show that we must have more principled Bolshevist criticism and self-criticism, which will make it possible to end the covert and overt attacks on Marr and to raise Soviet, materialist Marr linguistics to a higher level."

(*"Greek Shot: A controlled cast of the dice. The dice are set one atop the other, with the desired faces up. They are then thrown with a whiplike motion which causes them to twirl rapidly. See Drop Shot."*)

Marr trained many young people. To them he directed the following memorable words: "Neither faint-hearted retreat nor conciliatory appeasement. Forward, young comrades, our replacements!"

The "replacements" now will need replacements—Mr. Stalin has written a letter to *Pravda:* "We had Marxists at one time who claimed that the railways which remained in our country after the October Revolution were bourgeois and that it was not worthy of us Marxists to use them—that they should be demolished and new proletarian roads built. These people were given the nickname of troglodytes.

"Language," Mr. Stalin continued, "is not created by any given class but by a whole society of all classes, by the efforts of hundreds of generations. Language serves as a means of communication of a people—not one class, to the prejudice of other classes, but all classes. . . . The Russian language has not greatly changed since the time of Pushkin. It has served capitalists, aristocrats, the bourgeoisie, workers and peasants for centuries. . . . For whom is it necessary that water, earth, mountain, forest, fish, man, garden, to make, to produce, to trade, et cetera, should be called not water, earth, mountain, et cetera, but something else?"

For whom is it necessary and useful that planned aggression be named a "campaign for peace?" —G. P.

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Books

Corporations and Confusion

THE NEW SOCIETY. BY PETER DRUCKER. *Harper & Brothers. 352 pages. $5.00.*

This is the first book of Peter Drucker's that I have read—and that may be a damaging admission, for it is stated on the dust jacket that he "has long been recognized as America's leading student of the economic, social, and political problems of our industrial age." But I can at least lay claim to that cherished if slightly undistinguished qualification of the critic, namely, the fresh mind. So far as I am aware—and this seems to be somewhat exceptional—I had no position, either for or against Mr. Drucker, before opening this book. I might add that this is no longer the case.

Mr. Drucker's purpose in this book can be described only as cosmic. He sets out to describe contemporary economic life, how it is organized, how it functions, where and why it fails to function as it should, and what should be done about it. In just under forty chapters, grouped into nine parts, he takes up mass production; the modern corporation, or, to use his term, "the industrial enterprise," by which he means the whole complex of management, working force, and physical plant in the modern business unit; unions; the bases of conflict between union and management; the nature and shortcomings of management; worker security, including proposals for ensuring minimum income to the worker as a substitute for the guaranteed annual wage; depressions; a consideration of the way the large corporation should be organized; and much, much more.

One emerges from all this—and here I am leaning heavily to understatement—with mixed feelings. Mr. Drucker has a truly remarkable ability to combine fine and even brilliant perception with absolute tommyrot. American intellectuals (A. A. Berle, Jr., and Professor R. A. Gordon of the University of California are among the relatively few exceptions) have been too alarmed by the existence of the mammoth corporation to spend much time getting at its real character. It has been a monster to be destroyed, or anyhow curbed—not a phenomenon to be studied. Here Drucker is brilliantly uninhibited. He accepts the large corporation without cavil. Perhaps because his acceptance is so complete, his defense of bigness is superficial and even casuistic. (He defends the horizontal combination of similar firms, *à la* General Motors, by reference to

Hamilton and *The Federalist.*) He views the large enterprise as an organ, a vitally important one, of contemporary government. Its management exercises plenary authority over the business of getting things produced and distributed, and it is also endowed with a great deal of power over the real lives of its employees. This power, in Drucker's view, is not different from that exercised by the state. The enterprise does not have the power to send men to jail for violating its rules; it does have the equally fearsome sanction of consigning them to unemployment of greater or less duration.

Not only is the large corporation indispensable in the modern American community, but Drucker makes an interesting and persuasive argument that it is no less necessary in a socialist or Communist society. The United States Steel Corporation, the British Coal Board, and the Soviet Light Metals Trust are all power complexes enjoying considerable autonomy within their national communities. Under socialism the practical necessities of industrial government force the government to give to the enterprise much of the same independence that U. S. Steel insists upon as a sacred right. Viewed in this light, the large enterprise is not a mere photoenlargement of the entrepreneur of classical economics. Mr. Drucker has nothing but contempt for the romantic press-agentry of the N.A.M. which so pictures it.

There is certainly substance to Drucker's view of the corporation, even though there may be differences of opinion concerning the attractiveness of the government-by-corporation that he describes. He is also impressive on the problems of management, where he draws on extensive personal experience. He takes for granted the divorce of management from ownership in the large corporation. He views the board of directors, the presumed voice of the stockholder interest, as a historical anomaly. In all but the most exceptional cases, effective power rests with an autonomous and self-perpetuating group of officers which has little property stake in the concern.

However, he does not believe that this group has solved all of the prob-

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

lems presented to it, either by its constitution or by the large scale of the enterprises it administers. The question of succession—the critical question of how a self-perpetuating body perpetuates itself—is one unsolved problem. Corporation presidents, like heads of state, are often reluctant to train a successor lest they produce a dangerous rival: There is no satisfactory answer to the problem of whether to promote from within the company—and get a stale and departmentalized point of view—or to go outside and risk the consequent damage to company morale. Drucker is also critical of the high salaries management pays to itself, which he considers a peculiarly exacerbating factor in labor relations.

Above all he does not think that management has yet learned anything useful about improving communications among the various levels of the plant hierarchy. There are three separate worlds in the typical plant—top management, the foremen and other supervisory staff, and the workers—and each has little understanding of the other two. Their dealings with each other are characterized by irritation and conflict. One of Drucker's solutions is to turn over to a system of plant self-government (in practice it would appear to be the union) responsibility for welfare, recreation, and safety programs, for staffing shifts and gangs, and for administration of other routine. On such matters he believes the opportunity for ill-conceived action and provocation to be especially great.

Mr. Drucker is a defender, although at times a reluctant one, of the union, but he does not regard it as a wholly rational champion of the workman's interests. He argues that workers are not much interested in rates of pay. Other things, including security of income and employment, prestige, and contentment in the job, are much more important. But wage rates have become the measure of a union leader's success or failure. Resistance to all decreases in wage rates and periodic boosts are indispensable to union strategy and to the strategy of the union leader for keeping his job. This irrational preoccupation with wage rates not only increases the insecurity of the worker's income but also increases the vulnerability of the enterprise to depression. Both worker and employer would be benefited were collective bargaining centered on things that the worker really wants.

I am indebted to Professor Sumner Slichter for the observation that if, indeed, workers are not interested in rates of pay, the union leaders are guilty of a universal and also a highly improbable misunderstanding of their rank and file. For leaders at least *think* that rates of pay are important to the men. In any case the advantages of flexible wage rates are not so clear as Mr. Drucker assumes. The cutting of wage rates during a depression may ease the position of the individual corporation viewed as an individual corporation. There is a view that it could diminish wage payments and purchasing power sufficiently in the aggregate to make the position of all companies more difficult. The question obviously requires more analysis than Mr. Drucker gives it.

The author's failure to come fully to grips with this issue is symptomatic. Whenever he leaves the confines of the individual firm to comment on larger issues, the component of careful observation and good sense in Mr. Drucker's writing drops alarmingly. Thus, for reasons that are not sufficiently clear to be useful even to a corporation executive defending profits before a Congressional committee, Mr. Drucker believes that present levels of corporate earnings are too low. He thinks, present lush returns notwithstanding, that they should rise over the next several decades. It would be interesting to know what General Motors would do with the money.

However, the worst experience in mystical claptrap awaits the reader who tries to follow Mr. Drucker through his discussion of depressions. Yielding to an always underdeveloped resistance to *obiter dicta,* he first proclaims that "we are today as far away from a working depression policy as we ever were." This statement, which can only mean that the government is no more sophisticated in its understanding of the American economy than it was in 1929, and no more prepared to act on that knowledge, is simply and fantastically wrong. Mr. Drucker then attributes part of the difficulty in developing a policy to failure to distinguish clearly between what he calls a "business depression" and a "dislocation depression," a distinction which would not be clear when applied to any depression in American history, and which reveals only the truly sad confusion in Mr. Drucker's own mind. Then he cites the danger of what he terms a Keynesian remedy of dislocation depressions, which seems to commit Keynesians to increasing consumer incomes and expenditures during periods of inflation. No Keynesian of my acquaintance (I am proud to say I know many) would fail to disown such rubbish.

I suspect that one reason for the feebleness of this part of the book is that Mr. Drucker regards the state, the source of an anti-depression policy, as a feeble thing. It is unfortunate that he does not identify more explicitly than he does the role of the state in a capitalist community. If, as seems possible, his state, for reasons either of wisdom or its own helplessness, should forswear all but a minimum of effort to guide, restrain, or regulate his autonomous enterprises, then we should certainly have another basis for disagreement. —J. K. Galbraith

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Repose in a Korean restaurant: a soldier with his 'grease gun'

Again: soldiers move up, refugees flee

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